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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation studies the short-term infant health effects of manipulation of birth timing, the 
short-term elderly health effects of retirement and long-run associations between childhood 
socioeconomic status and health outcomes later in life.  
      In the first chapter, I assess the impact of the small change of birth timing on infant health at 
birth, by exploiting a phenomenon in which some parents avoid holiday babies, especially during 
the holiday season at the end of the year. I focus on all full-term singleton births delivered by 
mothers without medical problems during pregnancy because newborns’ health outcomes are 
believed to be similar in the traditional full term pregnant period (37 weeks to 41 weeks). Using 
New Jersey birth certificate data with a baby’s exact date of birth and the exact date of the 
mother’s last menstrual period during the years 1989 to 2011, it was estimated that about 207 
singleton births per year are moved to an early time from the Christmas break and the New 
Year’s break in the holiday season at the end of the year. Among different delivery methods, I 
find that induced vaginal and induced C-section deliveries are the two main methods used for the 
birth timing manipulation. I also find the group of mothers whose babies were born shortly 
before the holiday break appear to be slightly older, more educated, more likely to be white, 
more likely to be married, having more prenatal visits and fewer risky behaviors during 
pregnancy than mothers whose babies born during the holiday break. In addition, birth timing 
manipulation causes babies to be born before their expected delivery dates, which carries greater 
health risks, including lower Apgar scores, a lower probability of getting normal Apgar scores 
(i.e., scores > 7), and a higher probability of having respiratory problems.  
      In the second chapter, I investigate the short-term effects of retirement on health related 
outcomes and the mechanisms behind the effects by using a comprehensive, nationally 
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representative sample from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS). 
The mandatory retirement policy in China provides a quasi-experimental setting for the 
identification of the effects of retirement. By focusing on a sharp change in retirement status 
among males just below and just above the mandatory retirement age 60, and using regression 
discontinuity models, I show that retirement improves the mental health and well-beings of 
retirees. Although the effects are not statistically significant, I find retirement still improve the 
subjective health status and objective physical health of retirees. I further find that paying more 
attention to one’s own health, increased social activities as well as more frequent physical 
exercises might be the key mechanisms through which retirement improve health and well-
beings. 
      In the third chapter, I also use the CHARLS to estimate the long-term effect of childhood 
social-economics status (CSES) on several health outcomes of the elderly (people aged 45 to 80) 
in China. I find that for both men and women, unfavorable childhood life situation is associated 
with adverse health status in later life. Although those effects are partially mediated through 
education and adult income status, those effects remain statistically significant when I control for 
the education and income. I also find long-term CSES effects are stronger for women than for 
men. 
 13 
 
 
Chapter 1: Manipulation of Birth Timing and its 
Impact on Health at Birth 
1.1   Introduction 
      Since the 1990s, there have been some notable changes in approaching labor and delivery by 
physicians and parents. Physician financial incentives, parents’ preference, physicians’ 
convenience, unique cultures and educational benefits relative to school entry cutoff date drive 
the increase of scheduling birth at a time before the natural arrival of the baby, and this increase 
may be an important reason triggering the increase of induction, simulation and Cesarean section 
(C-section).  
      C-section (both elective and non-elective) has become the most common operation for 
women in American hospitals (Hall, et al., 2010). The overall C-section delivery rates have 
increased 60 percent from the most recent low of 20.7 percent in 1996 to the high of 32.9 percent 
in 2009 (Martin et al., 2012), and declined slightly to 32.7 percent in 2013 (Hamilton et al., 
2013). These rates have also exceeded the maximum C-section delivery rate of 15 percent, 
recommended by World Health Organization (WHO) more than one decade ago. At the same 
time, the rate of induction of labor has more than doubled from 9.6 percent in 1990 to 23.8 
percent in 2010 (Osterman and Martin 2014). However, the C-section rates are much lower in 
other developed countries, such as in 2008 French 18.8 percent, Japan 17.4 percent, Norway 16.6 
percent and Netherlands 13.52 percent.1 
                                                          
1 Gibbons, L., Belizán, J. M., Lauer, J. A., Betrán, A. P., Merialdi, M., & Althabe, F. (2010). The global numbers and costs of 
additionally needed and unnecessary cesarean sections performed per year: overuse as a barrier to universal coverage. World 
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      Because of the dramatic increase of induction and C-section, the average gestational age for 
singleton births in the United States slightly decreased (Davidoff et al., 2006; Bettegowda et al., 
2008). The number of Birth with 40 or more weeks’ gestation significantly decreased, and 
deliveries at 34 to 39 weeks’ gestation increased (Davidoff et al., 2006).  
      What are the consequences of small change in the timing of birth on the neonatal health 
outcomes? In the past, the period from 3 weeks before until 2 weeks after the estimated date of 
delivery was considered “term”, with the expectation that neonatal outcomes from deliveries in 
this interval were uniform and good. 2  Some researchers believe there is an insignificant 
difference in health outcomes between newborns whose birth dates were changed by elective 
induction or C-section and those whose birth dates are determined naturally. As a result, they 
support the use of scheduled delivery without a compelling medical reason through elective 
induction and elective C-section to satisfy physicians’ convenience and parents’ preference. 
Some research has shown that among “term” deliveries average neonatal outcomes still can vary 
by the timing of delivery even with this 5-week gestational age window: likelihood of adverse 
outcomes can be U-shaped, with the nadir around 39 weeks through 40 weeks of gestation (Tita 
et al., 2009; Reddy et al., 2011), 3  which suggests that induction and C-section without a 
compelling medical reason could be associated with greater risk of neonatal respiratory 
morbidity and mortality. Because physicians’ conducting randomized experiments on pregnant 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
health report, 30, 1-31. 
2 Gestation in singleton pregnancies lasts an average of 40 weeks (280 days) from the first day of the last menstrual period to the 
estimated date of delivery. In the past, the period from 3 weeks before until 2 weeks after the estimated date of delivery was 
considered “term”. The new definitions for term deliveries published in the Journal Obstetrics & Gynecology and endorsed in 
2013 by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine are: Early term: 
37 0/7 weeks through 38 6/7 weeks; Full term: 39 0/7 weeks through 40 6/7 weeks; Late term: 41 0/7 weeks through 41 6/7 
weeks; Post term: 42 0/7 weeks and beyond. 
3 In this paper, 37 weeks of gestation means 37 0/7 – 37 6/7 weeks of gestation, 38weeks of gestation means 38 0/7 – 38 6/7 
weeks of gestation, 39 weeks of gestation means 39 0/7 – 39 6/7 weeks of gestation, 40 weeks of gestation means 40 0/7 – 40 6/7 
weeks of gestation, 41 weeks of gestation means 41 0/7 – 41 6/7 weeks of gestation, and 42 weeks of gestation means 42 0/7 – 42 
6/7 weeks of gestation. 
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women are impossible assessing the risks of small change in the timing of birth, without 
exogenous variation in this small change.4 
      However, holiday season at the end of each year could induce a “natural experiment” for a 
pregnant woman whose expected date of delivery is around Christmas and New Year’s Day.5 On 
the one hand, she may deliver her baby slightly before holiday through elective induction and 
elective C-section for several reasons.6  For example, she does not want her baby to have a 
“holiday birthday”; she wants her baby to meet other family members before the holiday break; 
she wants a long post-natal break; she wants to get more tax refund if she can deliver her baby 
before the last day of a year; she may fear that her physician will not be available on a holiday, 
and so on. Lisa and Teny (1999) find that increasing the tax benefits by $500 raises the 
likelihood of delivering a baby in the last week of December rather than the first week of January 
by 26.9 percent. Furthermore, some other special dates may also affect parents’ decision on 
when they want their babies to arrive. Lo (2003), Gans and Leigh (2006), Lin et.al (2006) show 
that parents schedule baby's delivery on auspicious dates and avoid inauspicious birth dates. On 
the other hand, physicians may also like to shift the timing of birth early to satisfy their time 
arrangement. Gans et al. (2007) find that deliveries decreased by 1 to 4 percent during the days 
of the annual obstetricians and gynecologists’ conference in Australia and the United States, 
accompanied by an increase of those before the conference day. 
      In this study, using New Jersey birth certificate data with baby’s exact date of birth and exact 
date of mother’s last menstrual period (LMP) during the years 1989 to 2011, I assess the impact 
                                                          
4 It is almost impossible for physicians to randomly choose some pregnant mothers as treatment group and execute elective 
induction or C-section to them around their estimated timing of delivery. 
5 Although some parents may plan ahead about getting pregnant to delivery their babies on their favorite date or to avoid their 
unfavorable date, it is very hard to fortunately conceive on specific date. 
6 Few physicians want to be pacing the halls on Thanksgiving or Christmas, waiting for a mother to deliver," said Marilyn Curl, 
CNM, MSN, LCCE, FACCE and president of Lamaze International. Families often can feel stressed about the uncertainty of the 
baby's arrival and feel it may compromise the celebration of holidays. Some women also fear that their preferred healthcare 
provider won't be available and will agree to a scheduled early delivery to guarantee that their provider will be there for the birth. 
http://www.pregnancy.org/article/holidays-put-pressure-women-schedule-early-delivery. 
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of small change of birth timing on infant health at birth, by exploiting a phenomenon that some 
parents avoid holiday babies, especially in the holiday season at the end of each year. I focus on 
all full-term singleton birth delivered by mothers without medical problems during pregnancy. 
The reason why I only choose full term births is that newborns’ health outcomes are believed to 
be similar in the traditional full term pregnant period (i.e., 37 to 41 weeks), and the reason why I 
choose singleton births is that multiple pregnancies may increase the risk of certain 
pregnancy complications. 
      My results indicate that in New Jersey during the holiday season, about 207 singleton births 
per year are moved to an early time from the Christmas break and the New Year’s break in the 
holiday season at the end of each year from 1989 to 2011. The average daily number of singleton 
births during this period is about 295. Here, I define the Christmas break as the period from the 
day before Christmas Eve to the day after Christmas Day (i.e., December 23rd to December 26th). 
New Year break is defined as the period from the day before the New Year's Day to the day after 
the New Year's Day (i.e., December 31st to January 2nd). And holiday season is defined as the 
period from December 16th to January 5th. I find that induced vaginal and induced C-section 
delivery are two main methods used for the birth timing manipulation. In addition, I find a slight 
decrease in birth weight and gestational age among births in days just before the holiday break. 
This finding suggests that parents manipulate their baby’s birth timing during a holiday season 
probably in response to tax refund benefits, or the convenience for physicians and parents. 
      I also find that mothers whose babies were born shortly before the holiday break appear to be 
slightly older, more educated, more likely to be white, married, have more prenatal visits and 
fewer risky behaviors during pregnancy than mothers whose babies born during the holiday 
break were. I also find that birth timing manipulation that lets babies be born a little earlier than 
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their expected delivery dates could increase health risks of having lower Apgar scores, a lower 
probability of getting normal Apgar scores (Apgar scores > 7) and a higher probability of having 
respiratory problems. 7  Because those negative short-term health consequences are usually 
associated with higher health care costs, breastfeeding difficulties, learning and behavioral 
problems, as well as long-term health outcomes, parents and physicians should carefully evaluate 
whether scheduling delivery without compelling medical reasons through elective induction and 
elective C-section is indeed necessary. Policymakers also should pay more attention to the 
potential negative impact on infant health of scheduling delivery through elective induction and 
elective C-section. 
      The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I will discuss previous studies in Section 2, and 
describe the data in Section 3. Section 4 presents my empirical analysis and results. Section 5 
performs robustness checks, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
1.2    Previous studies 
     When the natural arrivial of the baby would put the baby's or mother's life or health at risk, 
parents and physicians always change the timing of birth through induction and C-section to 
lower health risk of newborns and pregnant women. However, even mothers and babies do not 
have a compelling medical problem to do so, the birth timing manipulation is still performed for 
a variety of other reasons. 
      First of all, the birth timing represents some unique pattern. Mathers (1983) analyzes births 
occurring in Australia and finds birth numbers per day have “seven-day birth cycle”. The most 
births are concentrated on Tuesdays to Fridays and least births on Sundays, which had 26 percent 
                                                          
7 Apgar score is a measure of the physical condition of a newborn infant. It is obtained by adding points (2, 1, or 0) for heart rate, 
respiratory effort, muscle tone, response to stimulation, and skin coloration; a score of ten represents the best possible condition. 
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fewer births than expected. Gans and Leigh (2008) also find that in U.S. and Australia, about 
one-third births who would have been delivered on a weekend were delivered on a weekday. 
      Parents who believe the possible long-term academic gains is more important than the short-
term savings of childcare cost may manipulate the birth timing as a way of early childhood 
investment. The reason is that older children perform better academically than their younger 
peers (McEwan & Shapiro 2008, McEwan & Shapiro 2008). Using birth records in Japan, where 
school entry rule is strictly enforced, Hitoshi (2015) finds that more than 1,800 births a year who 
would have been delivered in the week before the school entry cutoff date were delivered to the 
week following the school cutoff date. 
Parents and physicians may alter the birth timing because of their preference, convenience, 
and unique cultures. Using C-section rates from home countries of immigrant mothers in Norway 
as the measurement of patient preference of delivery, Grytten et al. (2013) find that a substantial 
share of C-section is due to delivery preferences and the high elective C-sections rate. Gans and 
Leigh (2012) exploit the particular conflict parents and physicians meet when they bargain over 
the timing of birth. Parents may not like inauspicious dates like February 29th and April 1st. If 
these inauspicious dates occur on a Monday or Friday, patients may have a strong preference to 
give birth on weekend, but the physicians may not want to work on the weekend. Their results 
show that parents’ preference defeats those of physicians in about one-quarter cases, suggesting 
parents could successfully manipulate the birth timing. Gans and Leigh (2009) find the number 
of births rose by 12 percent on 1 January 2000, the Millennium. Levy et al. (2011) find that in 
U.S. on Valentine’s Day the spontaneous births increased by 3.6 percent and C-section births 
increased by 12.1 percent. On Halloween, the spontaneous births decreased by 5.3 percent and 
C-section births increased by 16.9 percent. Almond et al. (2015) find that increased Chinese-
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American births on the dates with the lucky number 8 in Chinese culture, such as 8th, 18th, or 28th 
days of the month, and decreased Chinese-American births on the 4th, 14th and 24thof the month, 
those dates are considered unlucky in Chinese culture. 
      Parents and physicians may also manipulate the birth timing due to financial incentives. For 
physicians, Gruber et al. (1999) find that higher reimbursement fee triggers more C-section 
deliveries, the C-section procedure is one of the main mechanism of changing the timing of birth. 
A similar result was found by Grant (2009), his finding indicates that the one percentage point 
increase in C-section rate from about one-quarter of the original rate is attributed to an additional 
$1000 reimbursement for C-section procedure. For parents, Dickert-Conlin and Chandra 
(1999) find the increased tax benefit rise the probability of having the child in the last week of 
December rather than the first week of next year. Gans and Leigh (2009) find that in 2004 over 
1000 births were moved from June to July to get the $3000 baby bonus, which is eligible for 
children born on or after July 1st, 2004 in Australian. This shifting constituting 6 percent of the 
babies who would have been born in June. They also find the drop in the birth of June was 
mainly due to fewer C-section and induction procedures in June. And of the rise in births of July, 
half were C-section births, three-tenths were non-induced vaginal births, and two-tenths were 
induced vaginal births. All of these studies suggest that parents and physicians manipulate the 
birth timing because of monetary incentive, personal preference, unique cultures and so on.  
Regarding the health concerns, elective induction has been shown to increase the risk of C-
section for pregnant women who has never given birth either by choice or for any other reason, 
to increase in-hospital pre-delivery time and costs (Seyb et al. 1999; Maslow & Sweeny 2000), 
and in turn C-section increases the probability of maternal mortality and morbidity, the risk of 
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babies’ respiratory morbidity, the rate of complications, and the probability of neonatal intensive 
care unit admissions (Shearer 1993; Levine et al. 2001). 
However, there is limited correlational evidence in the medical and economics literature on 
the relationship between gestational length and health outcomes beyond birth. In addition, for 
pregnant women without medical reasons, the consequences of a small change in birth timing 
through elective induction and elective C-section on health have not been clearly assessed. 
Recent work in economics suggest that the small change of birth timing induced by tax benefits 
at the end of the year leads to a lower birth weight, a lower Apgar score, and an increase in the 
probability of being born with a low birth weight (Schulkind and Shapiro. 2014), and children 
born close to the 2,500-euro universal child benefit cancellation date in Spain suffered 
significantly higher hospitalization rates in the weeks following birth (Borra et al. 2016). 
      The first reason why I have limited literature in this area is no randomized trial data 
comparing infant health outcomes among births from elective induction and elective C-section 
versus vaginal delivery. It has been difficult to identify and report election induction and elective 
C-section because those procedures may not be included in hospital coding system or among 
payer’s reimbursable insurance claims is the second reason (Signore and Klebanoff 2008).  
This study makes three important contributions to current literature. First, studying data from 
the 1990s and 2000s, the period in which notes of induction and C-section rates increased 
dramatically, makes me able to understand how parents’ and physicians’ react to the incentives 
of altering birth time. Second, with baby’s exact date of birth and exact date of mother’s last 
menstrual period (LMP), I am able to calculate the gestational weeks and then distinguish 
mothers who have strong incentive to manipulate their baby’s birth time from who do not have 
this behavior. Finally, I am able to access the possible impacts of small birth timing manipulation 
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on infant health at birth. The investigation will have strong implications for making health 
policies and making birth timing manipulation decision with regard to elective induction and 
elective C-section. 
 
1.3   Data 
My analysis relies on the restricted-access data: Vital Statistics Natality records (birth 
certificates) for the years 1989 to 2011. The Vital Statistics Natality records are compiled by 
New Jersey Department of Health and Human Services and cover the universe of birth in New 
Jersey. These data include records for every birth and each record has information about family 
demographic characteristics including parents age, education, and marital status; about mother’s 
health and behavior during pregnancy (such as medical risk factors for this pregnancy, prenatal 
visit information, and behavior of smoking, taking drugs and drinking); about procedures and 
problems during labor and delivery (delivery method, obstetric procedures, and complications of 
births), as well as many newborns' health measures including birth weight, congenital 
malformations, the 1-minute Apgar score, the 5-minute Apgar score, and information on 
assisted ventilation usage. The two key variables in the confidential version of the data I obtained 
are the exact date of birth and the first day of Mother’s Last Menstrual Period (also called LMP).  
I only focus on singleton lower risk term births.8 The reason why I focus on the singleton 
births is that the health risk caused by multiple birth pregnancy will contaminate the health 
consequences caused by birth timing manipulation through elective induction and elective C-
section. The reason why I focus on the lower risk births is that I need to investigate the 
consequences of elective induction and C-section. I drop all the birth whose mothers have any 
                                                          
8 When I analyzed the birth data, I tried to include all births. The results (not shown) are very similar with the results I got from 
singleton births analysis.  
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medical risk factors during pregnancy from the sample of my singleton term birth, because the 
induction and C-section used by those pregnancies are to reduce natural childbirth risk caused by 
medical risk factors (Cardiac Disease, Diabetes, Renal Disease, Rh sensitization, Genital herpes 
and so on) on pregnancy.  In addition, the reason why I focus on term births is that the expected 
neonatal health outcomes from deliveries in the term interval are believed uniform and good. So 
after the pregnancy passes 37 weeks, parents and physicians may manipulate the birth timing for 
their own reasons. To analyze delivery procedure through which parents manipulate the birth 
timing, the characteristics of those parents, and health consequences of their babies, I do impose 
additional restrictions on the sample. First, I limit the sample to mothers between the ages of 20 
and 45, because the teen and older mother’s delivery decision are potentially complicated by 
other factors. Second, I limit the sample to families with five or fewer children in order to avoid 
the idiosyncrasies of especially large families. Finally, I combine 1989 – 2011 (23 years) of birth 
data provides information on 2.3 million singletons lower risk term births.  
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics for births of four groups occurring in the holiday 
season, the period from December 16th to January 5th. Holiday breaks are the Christmas break 
and New Year break. Here the Christmas break is the period from the day before Christmas Eve 
to the day after Christmas Day, December 23rd – December 26th. New Year break is the period 
from the day before New Year's Day to the day after New Year's Day, December 31st – January 
2nd. Four groups are singleton term birth, singleton term, and low-risk birth, singleton low-risk 
birth with gestational ages between 38 weeks to 40 weeks, and singleton low-risk birth with 
gestational ages between 39 weeks to 40 weeks. For every group, column (1) provides the 
summary statistics of births on the rest of days except holiday break in the holiday season, 
column (2) shows the statistics of births on holiday break, while column (3) reports the 
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difference. For example, the average mother’s age who give birth in others days of the holiday 
season is 0.32 years older than those who give birth in holiday break. A comparison of the 
sample on the column (3) shows that on average, mothers who do not give birth in holiday break 
are more likely to be white, older, educated, and have more prenatal visits than mothers who give 
birth in holiday break. In addition, C-section and induction are more popular in holiday break 
than in other days of the holiday season. Babies born in others days of holiday appear to be 
healthier than births in holiday break.9 
When I estimate the effects of birth timing manipulation on newborns health outcomes, I 
expand the sample to include a set of comparison period, which is 15 days before Holiday season 
(December 1st to December 15th) and 15 days after Holiday season (January 6th to January 20th). 
Table 1.2 provides a summary statistic for births in Holiday Season and in the comparison 
period. For every panel, column (1) provides the summary statistics of comparison period, 
column (2) shows the summary statistics of the holiday season, and column (3) reports the 
difference. Although many differences between Holiday Season and comparison period are 
smaller than the differences between holiday break and other days of the holiday season, the 
births in holiday season still appear to be in poor health relative to the births in the comparison 
period. These health outcome differences may be due to manipulation of birth timing in the 
holiday season.  
                                                          
9 There is the issue of selection in the decision to manipulate birth time. Only low-risk mothers will manipulate the birth timing 
because of their preference or monetary incentive. 
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1.4 Empirical analysis 10 
1.4.1 Manipulation of the birth timing 
      Figure 1.1, Figure 1.2, Figure 1.3 and Table 1.3, was made from New Jersey pooled 1989-
2011 birth data. Figure 1.1 shows the number of singleton births in December of 2000, 2003, 
2007 and 2010 and their following January (I randomly chose these four years from 1989-2011). 
I observe a trough around Charismas day, a trough around the New Year day, a peak before 
Charismas day and a peak before the New Year’s Day. In addition, it shows strong weekly cycle 
in the number of birth. More babies are delivered on weekdays and less on weekend.  
      Using pooled data from 1989 to 2011, I draw Figure 1.2. Every cell represents the average 
daily number of singleton births in NJ between 1989 and 2011, along with a ranking represented 
by the intensity of the color. Dark color represents this birthday is more common and vice versa. 
It indicates a large proportion of babies are born in fall and fewer babies are born in spring and 
winter. I can find that September clearly has many of the top days, but July and August aren’t far 
behind.  It looks like people conceive during all of those Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New 
Year’s parties. The 13th seems to be least common on average.  Perhaps that’s because many 
people see that as an unlucky day. In addition, it is clearly shown that around major holidays 
(July 4th, Thanksgiving, Christmas, New year’s day) there fewer babies born. At the end of the 
year, not only Christmas day but also the day around Christmas day, few singleton births were 
delivered. The Same situation happens around the New Year’s Day. Manipulation of birth timing 
may be the reason of this difference. 
       Table 1.3 shows top 30 and bottom 30 days of the mean daily number of singleton births 
throughout the year. The third least popular birthday falls on Christmas Eve, December 24th, 
                                                          
10 All my empirical analysis is based on singleton birth. The number of births means the number of singleton birth.  
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followed by December 25th and January 1st. It’s obvious that the least common birthdays fall at 
the beginning of January, at the end of November, and around Christmas time. 
      On day’s level, to test whether or not different days at the end of and the beginning of the 
year do have different effects on the number of birth per each day. Using all days in December 
and January (23 years * 62 days = 1426 days), I design the econometric model as blow: 
6
1
(j) (k)dy j dy k dy y dy
k
Y Day Dow Year   

       (1) 
      The dependent variable  takes two forms, the daily number of singleton birth for day  in 
year  and the log transformation of daily number of singleton birth to correct left-skewed 
distribution.  is the dummy variable for each day in December and January, and  
is one of six dummy variables for each day the week.  indicates the series of year trend.11 
 is the error term. My interested coefficient is the series of  , so I run 1426 (23 years * 62 
days = 1426 days) equations to get a group if . Every represent each day’s effect on daily 
number of singleton birth comparing with the average of all other days. 
      Results of the model (1) are shown in Table 1.4. Panel A and B represent similar results. The 
coefficients of column December 23th, 24th, 25th, 26th, 31th, January 1st and 2nd are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. However, the coefficients of column December 16th 
-22nd and 27th - 30th are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, showing more 
singleton births on these days. For example, the coefficient on column December 25th is negative 
101. Since a birth that is moved from this day will increase the number of other days. I calculate 
the total number of births moved from December 25th by dividing the coefficient of this day by 
2. So I estimate that about 50 (=101/2) births were moved from December 25th. In addition, the 
                                                          
11 I allowed the interaction term between the day of week fixed effects and year fixed effects to capture the different day of week 
effect of each year. These results are very similar. 
 26 
 
dependent variable of panel B is the log of the number of births on every day, so about 20 
percent births on December 25th were shifted to the earlier time.12 In general, fewer babies are 
born in days around Christmas day and in days around the New Year’s Day, and more babies are 
born before these days around Christmas day and before these days around the New Year’s Day. 
This pattern is consistent with what shown in Figure 1.3 (the line shows the mean daily number 
of births over the mean number of birth in the holiday season by different delivery methods.) 
      Two reasons may explain why holiday effects at the end of the year and beginning of the 
following year on the number of births extend beyond just two days (Christmas and the New 
Year’s Day). First, many companies and federal department adjust their Christmas holiday and 
the holiday of New Year’s Day when these two days fall on weekends. It means that a day off 
usually is observed on Monday (if the holiday falls on Sunday) or Friday (if the holiday falls on 
Saturday). Second, some people including pregnant women take annual leave during the 
Christmas and New Year Period.  
      Based on the results of the model (1), I choose the related windows shown in Table 1.5 to do 
the following analysis. Here holiday break is consisting of the Christmas break and New Year 
break. the Christmas break is the period from the day before Christmas Eve to the day after 
Christmas Day, December 23rd – 26th. New Year break is the period from the day before New 
Year's Day to the day after New Year's Day, December 31st – January 2nd. Holiday season is the 
holiday period at the end of the year and the beginning of the following year, December 16th – 
January 5th. The comparison period is 15 days before the holiday season and 15 days after the 
holiday season, December 1st – December 15th and January 6th – January 20th.  
                                                          
12 I suppose that the majority way of this movement is moving forward, because moving delivery date afterward is difficult to 
execute for pregnant mothers.   
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      On day’s level, to test the entire holiday break effect on the birth number, I use below 
econometric model (2). HB is the dummy variable indicating all days on holiday break.  
6
1
* (k)dy k dy y dy
k
Y HB Dow Year   

      (2) 
      Table 1.6 shows the results of the model (2).  Column 1 represents the results of all singleton 
low-risk term births, and other columns show the results of subgroups by different delivery 
procedures. Comparing the number of births in holiday break and the number of births in other 
days of the holiday season (Panel 1), the coefficient of holiday break is negative 59 for all births. 
This indicates that the total number of births moved from the holiday break to early days in the 
holiday season is about 207 (7*59/2 = 207). The dependent variable of Panel B in table 1.6 is log 
number of birth. The coefficient of holiday break is negative 0.214. I divide it by two and then 
convert it from log points to percentage points. I find that about 11.29 percent babies who would 
have been born in the holiday break were manipulated to delivery on others days before the 
holiday break. 
 
1.4.2 Nature of manipulation 
      Figure 1.2 (part 1 and part 2) decomposes the ratio of the daily number of birth to an average 
birth number by different birth procedures in December and January. The jump up and down 
patterns, which are similar to part 2 of Figure 1.2, clearly shows that births delivered by each 
procedure are less in holiday break and more in days before holiday break (Christmas and the 
New Year break), with the most significant decrease in induced vaginal births and on induced C-
section births. 
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      To understand the determinants of the manipulation of birth timing occurred at the end of the 
year, I try to figure out two different types of manipulation: “shifting” and “switching” on 
individuals’ level, which is originally presented by Schulkind and Shapiro (2014). Shifting is 
defined as a movement of birth timing but keeping the method of delivery unchanged. For 
example, having a birth before the the Christmas break than it would have, but the type of 
delivery is unchanged. Switching is defined as a change in the method of delivery. For instance, 
changing the delivery method from vaginal to C-section to have a baby a little early to avoid 
Christmas day. The birthing timing can only be shifted, be switched, or both shifted and 
switched. The regressions take two forms: 
6
1
* (k)i k dy y i i i
k
BP HB Dow Year X County    

        (3) 
6
1
* (k)i k dy y i i i
k
BP HS Dow Year X County    

        (4) 
      First, limiting all births between December 16th and January 5th (holiday season), I use model 
(3) to determine the manipulation of “shifting”. Then, limiting all births between December 1st 
and January 20th (holiday season and comparison period), I use model (4) to determine the 
manipulation of “switching”.  
      The dependent variable, BPi, is the set of indicator variables for different delivery 
procedures, such as C-section, vaginal, induced C-section, non-induced C-section, induced 
vaginal and non-induced vaginal delivery. For example, BPi equals to one if the birth procedure 
is C-section and zero otherwise. HB of equation (3) is the dummy variable indicating all days on 
holiday break. HS of equation (4) is the dummy variable indicating all days on holiday season. Xi 
is a vector of parents and child characteristics includes indicators for whether this mother is 
black or white; four mother education categories (<12, high school, some college, and college or 
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more); mother age categories (20-24, 25-34, 35+); indicators for smoking, drug, alcohol, and 
prenatal visits during pregnancy; indicators for birth order; indicators for the number of children 
in this family; and an indicator for male child. Countyi captures county fixed effects. The 
interested coefficient is , which measures the likelihood of having a certain type of delivery in 
holiday break relative to this type in other days in holiday season. 
      Table 1.7 and 1.8 separately shows the estimates of the model (3) and (4) for different 
delivery procedures. Panel A shows the results of the babies who are all full term (37 weeks - 41 
weeks) singleton low-risk births, whose mothers are between the ages of 20 and 45, whose 
families with five or fewer children, and whose mothers have any medical risk factors for this 
pregnancy. To get panel B, I only keep the gestation of 38 weeks - 40 weeks from panel A, and 
keep the gestation of 39 weeks - 40 weeks to get panel C. The coefficient on HB, displayed in 
column (1) of Table 1.7, can be interpreted as the effect of HB on the likelihood of a holiday 
break C-section in holiday season. For Panel A, HB is associated with approximately a 2.1 
percentage point decrease in the probability of C-section births in holiday break. An analogous 
estimate for vaginal and induction are displayed in Column (3) and Column (4). HB is associated 
with a 2.11 percentage point increase in the probability of vaginal births in holiday break, and 
with a 4.75 percentage point decrease in the probability of induced births in holiday break.  
      Then, I estimate the regression (3) by four mutually exclusive delivery procedures: inducted 
C-section, non-induced C-section, induced vaginal, and non-induced vaginal. Results are shown 
in column (4)-(7) of Panel A of table 1.7, I estimate that HB is associated with about a 4.75 
percentage point, 0.743 percentage point, 1.36 percentage point, 3.99 percentage point decrease 
in the probability of induction, induced C-section, non-induced C-section, and induced vaginal 
births in holiday break. Correspondingly, HB is associated with about a 6.1 percentage point 
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increase in the probability of a non-induced vaginal in holiday break, which is the closest proxy I 
have for a spontaneous, non-scheduled birth. This finding confirms the possibility that pregnant 
women may be able to control the timing of spontaneous births in somehow.13 Even though I 
restrict the sample to Panel B, and C, the magnitude of these effects does not change 
significantly. So, these results suggest that scheduling C-section and induction are two most 
possible channels through which parents manipulate the birth timing to deliver babies earlier. 
      To examine whether any of the changes in the timing of birth can be attributed to the 
manipulation of “switching”, I investigate whether holiday season is correlated with the 
likelihood of having a certain type of delivery in holiday season relative to a comparison period. 
The regression takes the model (4), where I extend the sample to include the births on 
comparison period. It is important to note that those parents who have babies on comparison 
period have less incentive of avoiding holiday babies. So  is our coefficient of interest; it 
measures whether specific delivery births are more likely in holiday season compared to in 
comparison period. The results are showed in table 1.8. For all delivery methods, the coefficients 
in each Panel are small and statistically insignificant. This imply that parents manipulate the 
timing of birth to avoid holidays at the end of the year not by changing the delivery methods, but 
by schedule C-section and induction earlier. This scheduled induction result in the increase 
induced vaginal births and induced C-section births. Thus, the effects on newborns’ health 
outcome in the following analysis are considered to be primarily the results of changing the 
timing of the births and not changing the type of delivery. 
 
                                                          
13 Gans & Leigh (2009) find that the non-induced vaginal births rose after the introduction of baby bonus. Levy et al. (2011) find 
that for spontaneous births, there were a 5.3 percent decrease on Halloween and a 3.6 percent increase on Valentine’s Day.  
 31 
 
1.4.3 Parental characteristics 
      In this part, I want to figure out the relationship between higher or lower socioeconomic 
status (SES) that parents belong to and the behavior of the birth timing manipulation, and also 
the relationship between health-related behavior and the behavior of the birth timing 
manipulation. There are two concerns about this relationship. The first one is that higher-SES 
parents are more likely to have private health insurance than lower-SES parents, so they are more 
able to affect the birth timing. Second, since many health insurance companies do not cover 
elective induction and elective C-section, higher-SES parents might afford those higher bills. 
Third, parents who are more likely to move their baby’s birth date to earlier days before holiday 
break might also have better prenatal care and better health-related behaviors during pregnancy. I 
regress parent’s characteristics, the situation of prenatal care, and health-related behaviors on HB 
(holiday break), controlling day of week, year and county fixed effects. The model (5) is: 
6
1
* (k)i k dy y i i
k
Parents HB Dow Year County   

       (5) 
     Table 1.9 represents the results of the model (5). It appears that parents whose children were 
born shortly before the holiday break are slightly older; more likely to be educated, be white, be 
married; and less likely to be Hispanic. In addition, they have a higher probability of having 
prenatal visits, have a higher number of total prenatal visits, and have less risk behavior 
(smoking and taking drugs) during pregnancy. These results are consistent with my hypothesis 
that parent who manipulates their baby’s birth date to days shortly before holiday breaks at the 
end of the year are more likely to be higher SES.  
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1.4.4 Health outcomes  
      I pay attention to some health consequences of birth time manipulations, such as gestational 
age at birth, birth weight, Apgar score and the usage of the ventilator. Gestation is an important 
outcome I need to investigate because it presents how long the fetus growing in utero. Gestation 
is the duration of the children’s birth date and the mother’s last menstrual period (LMP).14 If 
parents manipulate baby’s birth timing to a little bit early time before the expected due date, I 
can forecast that the average gestation weeks will be slightly decreased. Apgar is a quick test on 
baby’s Appearance, Pulse, Grimace, Activity and Respiration at 1 and 5 minutes after birth. For 
each category, the infant is given a score of 0, 1 or 2. The scores are added up and the total sum 
is their Apgar score, and the score between 7 and 10 is generally considered normal. Apgar is 
also an important indicator of infant’s overall health situation. Of course, birth weight can even 
reflect the future health situation. Furthermore, birth timing manipulation may increase the 
probability of having immature lung and respiratory problem, and then increase the probability 
of using ventilation.  
      To assess how a small and elective change of birth timing affect infant health outcomes in 
short term, I use regression model (4) with infant health outcomes as the dependent variable. I 
compare health outcomes of birth in the holiday season with health outcomes of birth in the 
comparison period (15 days before the holiday season and 15 days after the holiday season). The 
reason why I do not compare health outcomes of births in holiday break and those in other days 
of the holiday season is that I want to avoid sample selection problem. For example, two babies 
are all due on December 25th. Baby one would weight 3200g on December 25, but baby two 
would only weight 2600g on December 25. Suppose the birth time of baby one may be 
                                                          
14 Last menstrual period (LMP) is an important variable helping us to calculate gestation. And gestation is related to birth time 
manipulation behavior and many other health outcomes. However, getting confidential information of LMP and birth date from 
public data or survey date is very difficult.  
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manipulated by elective C-section to December 20 and baby one’s birth weight will become to 
3000g (5 days forward). If I compare the birth weight of baby one, who was shifted, with the 
birth weight of baby two who was not shifted. I may conclude that manipulation of birth timing 
makes baby bigger (3200 g is greater than 2600g). However, the fact is that baby one is smaller 
because of manipulation of birth timing (baby one’s birth weight changed from 3200g to 3000g). 
So I compare health outcomes in the holiday season and in comparison period to eliminate 
selection bias. 
      Panel A of Table 1.10 displays the health results for all full-term singleton birth. It shows that 
babies born in holiday season are associated with shorter gestation, lower birth weight, and lower 
Apgar 5 score. On average, babies born in holiday season have a 0.0195-week decrease in 
gestation weeks relative to the comparison period. This effect, on average, is about 0.14 day 
(3.28 hour) reduction in gestation per child born in the holiday season (not just those who are 
shifted), and this reduction is corresponding to the 4.97-gram birth weight drop. Babies gain 
approximately 225 grams per week in the final trimester of pregnancy. 4.97-gram drop in birth 
weight is about 0.15 percent of the mean birthweight 3351 gram. In addition, 5 minutes Apgar 
score and the likelihood of getting normal 1 minute Apgar score are less for those babies who 
born slightly before the holiday break. As I narrow down my sample to babies whose mother is a 
low-risk mother, and to births whose gestation is between 39 weeks to 40 weeks, the effect on 
birthweight become statistically insignificant, but the probability of using ventilation greater than 
30 minutes increased. Although the magnitude of these statistically significant effects is small, I 
should know that they are driven by a small number of births whose birth dates are successfully 
shifted. The related health cost and medical cost may be very large.  
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1.5 Robustness check  
      In this part, using a great deal of information about pregnancy and delivery methods in New 
Jersey Vital Statistics records, I try to figure out which mother is highly likely to manipulate her 
baby’s birth time. Then I directly test the relationship between birth timing manipulation and 
parents’ characteristics and estimate the health effects of birth timing manipulation on newborns.  
      First of all, I choose the group of all low-risk term birth, because only parents who believe 
their babies are healthy in the uterus and will be healthy when delivered may consider 
manipulating their baby’s birth timing to slightly early days by reason of holidays at the end of 
the year. In other words, to exclude the effects of concerns about medical problems on decision 
making of delivery methods, I only keep term birth whose mothers have fewer health problems 
during pregnancy. To get this group, from entry sample I drop all births whose mothers have any 
medical risk factors, such as diabetes, renal disease, cardiac disease, genital herpes, incompetent 
cervix, for this pregnancy. I drop some birth with some complications of labor and/or delivery, 
such as prolonged labor (>20 hrs.), seizures during labor, breech, cephalopelvic disproportion, 
anesthetic complications fetal distress and etc. Then I keep birth whose mother may have the 
incentive to manipulate the birth timing. Incentive means if any day of holiday break is in 
expectant mother’s expected term delivery period (37 weeks to 41 weeks), this expectant mother 
may love to avoid holiday babies.  
      From above restricted sample, I choose all non-induced vaginal births as my control group 
based on the delivery procedure, because the non-induced vaginal birth is the closest proxy for 
spontaneous and non-scheduled birth without any manipulation of birth timing. From remaining 
birth (non-induced C-section, induced C-section, and induced vaginal birth), I drop repeat C-
section birth, because in many cases vaginal delivery is not recommended after C-section. 
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Furthermore, I drop those whose birth date is later than their expected due date, because passing 
the due date (the 280th day after last menstrual period or the day at fully 40 weeks) is an 
important reason for physicians to suggest induction and/or C-section. Then the remaining births 
are my treatment group. Their timing of birth is highly likely to be manipulated to avoid holiday 
breaks at the end of the year. I need to clarify that mothers on my treatment group are not sure to 
change their baby’s birth timing, but they are higher likelihood to alert their baby’s birth timing 
due to holiday breaks at the end of the year. 
      Table 1.11 presents the summary statistics for the control group, in which babies are all non-
induced vaginal birth, and for treatment group, which includes all birth whose birth timing are 
highly likely to be manipulated. Panel A are all birth satisfying the setting of my treatment and 
control group. Panel B and Panel C are under the restriction of birth date. Panel B restricts the 
birth date to December 1st – January 20th, which are combined period of the holiday season and 
comparison period. Similarly, Panel C restricts the birth date to December 16th – January 5th 
(Holiday season period). It shows that parents on treatment group are slightly older, higher 
educated, having more prenatal visits, and having fewer risk behaviors on pregnancy. It also 
presents that babies on control group have slightly higher Apgar scores, and have a lower 
likelihood of getting the aid of ventilation. Even I narrow down the window of birth date to Panel 
B and C, those differences between two groups present the similar pattern. 
      To investigate the relationship between parents’ characteristics and parents’ manipulation 
behavior, and the relationship between babies’ health outcomes and parents’ manipulation 
behavior. I use below two models. The  indicates the treatment group in which 
baby’s birth timing are highly likely to be manipulated. 
6
1
* _ (k)i k dy y i i
k
Parents HL manipulate Dow Year County   

       (6) 
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6
1
_ * _ (k)i k dy y i i i i
k
Health Outcomes HL manipulate Dow Year X County    

        (7) 
          Table 1.12 represents the results of the model (6). In the treatment group, mothers are 
about one year older than mothers in control group; fathers are about 0.63 years older; mothers 
have about 0.4 more years of education, and fathers have about 0.3 more years of education. In 
addition, parents are less likely to be Hispanic, to have risk behaviors on pregnancy, and more 
likely to have prenatal visits. Again, all panels (narrow down the window of birth date to Panel B 
and C) with different birth date restrictions show a similar pattern.  
      Table 1.13 displays the results of the model (7). Apgar and ventilation usage are my 
interested health outcomes of newborns. Columns (1) and (2) show that the behavior of highly 
likely to manipulate birth timing is associated with a decreased 1 minute Apgar score and a 
decrease in the likelihood of getting a normal minute Apgar score. Converting the results of 
Column (1) to the point estimate suggesting that babies whose birth timing are highly likely to be 
manipulated have 0.31 percent, 0.35 percent, 0.53 percent decrease in average 1 minute Apgar 
score for Panel A, B, and C. In addition, Columns (3) shows that the 5 minute Apgar scores of 
the newborn is also negatively affected by the behavior of manipulation birth timing. Although 
the likelihood of getting normal 5 minute Apgar score is a little bit higher for babies on treatment 
group, they are statistically insignificant. In addition, Column (5), (6), and (7) suggests that the 
probability of getting the aid of ventilation is higher for births on treatment group, in which 
babies’ birth timing are highly likely to be manipulated. Evaluating the point estimate of Column 
(5) shows that 0.088 and 0.097-point increase of the probability of using any ventilation for 
panel A and B at 90 percent significant level. Because ventilation usage is very rare, converting 
the point change showed on Column (5) to percentage change, the corresponding effects are 54.8 
percent and 60.43 percent increase. Although the effect of “highly likely to manipulate” on 
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ventilation usage greater than 30 minutes and on ventilation usage less than 30 minutes are 
statistically insignificant, the positive point estimates suggest an increased probability of using 
ventilation. 
      These results again confirm my conclusion drawn from the previous main analysis, under 
which I compare the newborns’ average health outcomes in the holiday season and in the 
comparison period. The higher-SES parents might be more able to affect their children’s birth 
time, and manipulation of birth timing without any medical problems will negatively affect the 
infant’s health consequences.  
 
1.6 Conclusion and future directions 
      Scheduling births without any medical reasons has become more and more common all over 
the world. To satisfy parents and physicians’ preference and convenience, some parents and 
physicians schedule to let them happen before the natural determined dates, using elective 
induction or elective C-section. However, the effects of a small reduction on gestational length 
on newborns’ health outcomes have not been fully examined. Holiday season at the end of the 
year could be thought as a “natural experiment” for pregnant women whose expected due dates 
are around Christmas day or New Year’s Day. Analysis on the effects of the holiday season 
helps me assess the infants’ health costs if mothers without any medical problems during 
pregnancy alter their babies’ birth timing in the holiday season. 
      Using restricted-access New Jersey birth data from 1989 to 2011, I estimate that in New 
Jersey about 207 singleton births per year are shifted from the Christmas break and the New 
Year’s break to a slightly early time. This shift is mainly driven by the change in delivery 
procedures, that is the increased use of elective C-section and elective induction. Among the 
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reduction in singleton low-risk births during the holiday break, 44 percent were C-section births, 
and 34 percent were induced births. Further dividing the drop by four mutually exclusive 
delivery methods, I estimate that about 11.5 percent induced C-section, 5.6 percent non-induced 
C-section, 16.7 percent induced vaginal, and 4.4 percent non-induced vaginal births are shifted to 
an early time from the holiday breaks at the end of a year. The results suggest that induced C-
section and induced vaginal delivery are two main methods used for manipulating the birth 
timing.  
      The individual-level analysis indicates that mothers whose babies were born shortly before 
the holiday break appear to be slightly older, more educated, more likely to be white, married, 
and having more prenatal visits than mothers whose babies were born during the holiday break. 
My findings show that the average gestation age and birth weight are lower for births in the 
holiday season than births in the comparison period. In addition, Apgar scores, the likelihood of 
getting normal Apgar scores, and the probability of getting the aid of ventilation are also affected 
by the small change of birth timing. 
      As the induction and C-section rate continues to rise, parents and physicians should carefully 
compare the costs and benefits of birth timing manipulation even when mothers and fetus do not 
have medical problems. Policymakers should take into account the health costs of elective 
induction and elective C-section. More empirical studies on the long-term health effects of birth 
timing manipulation by elective induction and elective C-section are also needed. 
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1.8 Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1.1  The number of singleton births in December of 2000, 2003, 2007 and 2010 and their 
following January 
 
 
 
The dotted line represents the singleton birth number. The solid line shows the average birth 
number on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday using pooled 
data from 1989 to 2011. 
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Figure 1.2 Rank of the singleton birth in one year 
 
 
 
Every cell represents the average number of babies born in NJ between 1989 and 2011. The 
darker, the more common days. And the lighter, the less common days. 
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Figure 1.3  Singleton birth by different procedures 
 
 
 
 
The line shows the mean daily number of births over the mean number of birth in the holiday 
season by different delivery methods. The data come from polled 1989 – 2011 birth data. 
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Table 1.1  Summary statistics - Comparison of Holiday Break and others days in Holiday Season 
 
 
Other 
days
Holiday 
Break
Other 
days
Holiday 
Break
Other 
days
Holiday 
Break
mother_age 29.80 29.58 0.22 *** 29.90 29.64 0.26 *** 29.84 29.55 0.29 ***
mother_edu 13.79 13.68 0.11 *** 13.83 13.71 0.12 *** 13.84 13.71 0.13 ***
% mother_married 77.03 76.24 0.79 77.75 76.24 1.51 ** 78.08 76.78 1.30 *
% mother_black 13.26 14.28 -1.03 ** 13.13 14.64 -1.52 *** 12.66 14.32 -1.65 ***
% mother_white 75.87 74.52 1.35 ** 75.52 73.80 1.73 *** 76.42 74.63 1.79 ***
% mother_hispanic 19.22 20.19 -0.97 * 19.33 20.20 -0.87 * 19.09 19.66 -0.57
% mother_asian 8.36 8.48 -0.13 8.74 8.87 -0.13 8.36 8.40 -0.04
% mother_alcohol 1.37 1.22 0.15 1.22 1.19 0.03 1.28 1.21 0.07
% mother_tobacco 7.30 7.95 -0.65 7.11 7.72 -0.61 * 7.02 7.72 -0.70 *
% prenatal_visits 99.56 99.46 0.10 99.62 99.50 0.12 99.66 99.52 0.14
prenatal_visits_number 10.98 10.89 0.09 ** 10.94 10.88 0.06 11.03 10.95 0.08 *
father_age 32.62 32.41 0.20 *** 32.71 32.52 0.19 ** 32.68 32.43 0.25 **
father_edu 13.85 13.77 0.08 ** 13.89 13.80 0.09 ** 13.89 13.79 0.10 **
% boy 50.52 50.30 0.22 50.48 50.40 0.08 49.90 49.70 0.20
number of children 1.78 1.77 0.01 1.79 1.78 0.02 1.78 1.76 0.02
0.00
% c section 17.14 15.51 1.63 *** 16.76 14.96 1.80 *** 16.62 15.08 1.54 ***
% vaginal 81.90 83.47 -1.57 *** 82.32 84.13 -1.81 *** 82.42 83.99 -1.58 ***
% induction 17.47 12.40 5.07 *** 16.17 11.27 4.90 *** 16.57 11.62 4.95 ***
% induced c section 3.54 2.82 0.72 *** 3.01 2.37 0.64 *** 3.24 2.59 0.65 **
% non induced c section 13.59 12.67 0.92 ** 13.75 12.57 1.17 ** 13.38 12.48 0.89 *
% induced vaginal 13.78 9.46 4.32 *** 13.03 8.81 4.21 *** 13.21 8.93 4.28 ***
% non induced vaginal 68.03 73.88 -5.85 *** 69.22 75.18 -5.97 *** 69.13 74.92 -5.79 ***
Gestational age 39.30 39.26 0.04 *** 39.15 39.16 -0.01 39.49 39.50 -0.01 *
Birth weight 3409.49 3395.77 13.72 ** 3407.81 3397.54 10.28 * 3445.20 3438.67 6.53
apgar1 8.52 8.52 0.00 8.53 8.54 0.00 8.52 8.53 -0.01
% apgar1 >= 7 96.39 96.42 -0.03 96.60 96.66 -0.06 96.41 96.60 -0.19
apgar5 9.05 9.05 0.00 9.05 9.06 -0.01 9.05 9.06 -0.01
% apgar5 >= 7 99.69 99.69 0.01 99.71 99.72 0.00 99.70 99.69 0.01
% ventilation < 30 0.12 0.12 -0.01 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.09 *
% ventilation >= 30 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.03
% Any ventilation 0.22 0.23 -0.01 0.22 0.17 0.05 0.25 0.14 0.11
% RDS 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.00
N 37,948 15,385 53,333 28,467 11,743 40,210 21,916 9,049 30,965
Holiday Break (HB) consists of period of [12/23, 12/26] and period of [12/31,01/02].
Holiday Season (HS ) is the period of [12/16, 1/5].
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Term + Low risk + [37, 42] Term + Low risk + [38, 40] Term + Low risk + [39, 40]
Variables
Diff. Diff. Diff.
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Table 1.2 Summary statistics - comparison of holiday season and comparison period 
 
 
Table 1.2
Summary statistics - comparison of holiday season and comparison period
Compariso
n Period
Holiday 
season
Compariso
n Period
Holiday 
season
Compariso
n Period
Holiday 
season
mother_age 29.81 29.74 0.07 * 29.92 29.82 0.09 ** 29.89 29.76 0.13 ***
mother_edu 13.77 13.76 0.01 13.80 13.80 0.00 13.82 13.80 0.02
% mother_married 77.52 76.80 0.72 ** 77.74 77.31 0.43 78.20 77.70 0.50
% mother_black 13.33 13.56 -0.22 13.43 13.57 -0.14 12.86 13.14 -0.29
% mother_white 75.72 75.48 0.24 75.22 75.02 0.20 76.19 75.90 0.30
% mother_hispanic 18.95 19.50 -0.56 * 19.05 19.58 -0.54 * 18.65 19.25 -0.60 *
% mother_asian 8.35 8.39 -0.04 8.69 8.78 -0.09 8.43 8.37 0.06
% mother_alcohol 1.30 1.33 -0.02 1.25 1.21 0.04 1.28 1.26 0.02
% mother_tobacco 7.31 7.48 -0.17 7.10 7.29 -0.19 6.96 7.23 -0.27
% prenatal_visits 99.58 99.54 0.05 99.62 99.58 0.04 99.63 99.62 0.01
prenatal_visits_number 10.99 10.95 0.04 * 10.96 10.92 0.04 11.05 11.01 0.05
father_age 32.63 32.56 0.07 * 32.73 32.66 0.07 32.70 32.61 0.09 *
father_edu 13.84 13.83 0.01 13.86 13.86 0.00 13.88 13.86 0.02
% boy 50.79 50.46 0.33 50.99 50.46 0.53 50.09 49.84 0.25
number of children 1.79 1.78 0.01 * 1.80 1.79 0.02 ** 1.79 1.77 0.01 *
% c section 16.94 16.67 0.27 16.23 16.24 0.00 16.39 16.17 0.22
% vaginal 81.99 82.36 -0.37 82.74 82.85 -0.11 82.49 82.88 -0.39
% induction 15.84 16.01 -0.17 14.58 14.74 -0.16 15.11 15.12 -0.01
% induced c section 3.47 3.33 0.13 2.90 2.83 0.07 3.15 3.05 0.10
% non induced c section 13.46 13.32 0.14 13.33 13.41 -0.08 13.23 13.12 0.12
% induced vaginal 12.24 12.54 -0.29 11.58 11.80 -0.21 11.85 11.96 -0.11
% non induced vaginal 69.65 69.72 -0.07 71.06 70.96 0.10 70.55 70.82 -0.27
Gestational age 39.29 39.29 0.00 39.16 39.15 0.01 * 39.50 39.50 0.01 *
Birth weight 3410.53 3405.54 4.99 * 3407.24 3404.81 2.43 3444.15 3443.29 0.86
apgar1 8.52 8.52 0.01 8.54 8.53 0.01 8.53 8.52 0.01
% apgar1 >= 7 96.63 96.40 0.23 * 96.82 96.62 0.20 96.65 96.47 0.18
apgar5 9.06 9.05 0.00 9.06 9.05 0.01 * 9.06 9.05 0.01 *
% apgar5 >= 7 99.69 99.69 0.00 99.72 99.71 0.01 99.73 99.70 0.03
% ventalation < 30 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.15 0.11 0.04
% ventalation >= 30 0.08 0.11 -0.02 0.06 0.10 -0.04 * 0.06 0.11 -0.06 **
% Any ventalation 0.21 0.23 -0.01 0.19 0.20 -0.01 0.20 0.22 -0.02
% RDS 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.01
N 53,333 79,928 133,261 40,210 61,157 101,367 30,965 40,279 71,244
Holiday Season (HS ) is the period of [12/16 , 01/05].
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Comparison Period of Holiday Season (CHS ) consists of the period of [12/01, 12/15] and the period of [01/06, 01/20].    
They are fifteen days before and fifteen days after Holiday Season (HS ).
Term + Low risk Term + Low risk + [38, 40] Term + Low risk + [39, 40]
Variables
Diff. Diff. Diff.
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Table 1.3 Top 30 and bottom 30 days of mean daily number of singleton births throughout the 
year 
 
 
Month Day Month Day
7 7 350 1.13 1 4 13 294 0.95 30
9 15 340 1.10 2 1 3 294 0.95 29
7 15 338 1.09 3 12 10 292 0.94 28
9 9 336 1.08 4 2 13 292 0.94 27
9 28 336 1.08 5 12 6 292 0.94 26
8 10 336 1.08 6 1 30 292 0.94 25
9 27 335 1.08 7 2 19 291 0.94 24
7 10 334 1.08 8 4 1 290 0.94 23
9 18 334 1.08 9 1 13 290 0.94 22
9 17 333 1.07 10 1 9 288 0.93 21
9 22 333 1.07 11 10 30 288 0.93 20
7 8 333 1.07 12 11 29 288 0.93 19
9 21 333 1.07 13 11 22 286 0.92 18
9 14 333 1.07 14 11 24 285 0.92 17
6 30 333 1.07 15 11 13 285 0.92 16
9 23 333 1.07 16 2 29 283 0.91 15
7 28 333 1.07 17 11 23 279 0.90 14
6 28 333 1.07 18 12 31 279 0.90 13
7 20 332 1.07 19 11 28 277 0.89 12
9 10 332 1.07 20 10 31 277 0.89 11
7 1 332 1.07 21 11 26 275 0.89 10
8 18 332 1.07 22 11 27 271 0.87 9
9 29 332 1.07 23 12 23 271 0.87 8
7 14 331 1.07 24 12 26 266 0.86 7
8 9 331 1.07 25 11 25 264 0.85 6
9 20 331 1.07 26 1 2 259 0.84 5
7 6 330 1.06 27 7 4 255 0.82 4
8 12 330 1.06 28 12 24 239 0.77 3
9 13 330 1.06 29 1 1 224 0.72 2
7 27 330 1.06 30 12 25 194 0.63 1
T ble 1.3
Rank
Notes: The ratio to the average is the average number of singlton births on a given day divided by average 
singleton births across all days. Therefore, a value of 1.10 presents a 10 percent increase in daily births compared 
to the yearly average. Mean daily singleton birhs during 1989 - 2011 are 316. The days relative to our Holiday 
Season are indicated by boldface. The data comes from pooled 1989 - 2011 birth data.
Top 30 and bottom 30 days of mean daily number of singleton births throughout the year
Birth date Mean daily 
number of 
births
Ratio to 
average daily 
birth
Rank
Birth date Mean daily 
number of 
births
Ratio to 
average daily 
birth
Top 30 days Bottom 30 days
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Table 1.4   Days effects on number of singleton births 
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1
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2
6
1
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2
6
1
,4
2
6
1
,4
2
6
1
,4
2
6
1
,4
2
6
1
,4
2
6
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d
0
.7
0
7
0
.7
0
4
0
.7
0
5
0
.7
0
5
0
.7
0
5
0
.7
0
4
0
.7
3
1
0
.7
1
0
.7
0
3
0
.7
0
4
0
.7
0
4
N
o
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s
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R
e
u
s
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s
 o
f 
e
q
u
a
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o
n
 (
1
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 T
h
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 r
e
g
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s
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io
n
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n
 d
a
y
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e
v
e
l.
S
a
m
p
le
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n
c
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d
e
s
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ll
 f
u
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 t
e
rm
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h
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o
w
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k
 s
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g
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n
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ir
th
s
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D
a
y
 o
f 
w
e
e
k
 d
u
m
m
ie
s
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n
d
 y
e
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r 
d
u
m
m
ie
s
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re
 c
o
n
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o
ll
e
d
 i
n
 t
h
e
 r
e
g
re
s
s
io
n
.
R
o
b
u
s
t 
s
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n
d
a
rd
 e
rr
o
rs
 i
n
 p
a
re
n
th
e
s
e
s
.
*
*
*
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<
0
.0
1
, 
*
*
 p
<
0
.0
5
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*
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0
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u
m
b
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n
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e
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V
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a
b
le
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u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
b
ir
th
V
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a
b
le
V
a
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a
b
le
P
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n
e
l 
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D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
 i
s 
th
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u
m
b
e
r 
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f 
b
ir
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m
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ir
th
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m
b
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f 
b
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u
m
b
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o
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b
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Table 1.5   Holiday break, holiday season, and comparison period 
 
 
T
ab
le
 1
.5 T
er
m
s
H
ol
id
ay
 B
re
ak
   
   
 
(H
B
)
23
24
25
26
31
1
2
H
ol
id
ay
 S
ea
so
n
   
 
(H
S
)
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
1
2
3
4
5
C
om
pa
ri
so
n
 P
er
io
d 
(C
H
S
)
12
/1
-1
2/
15
1/
6 
- 
1/
20
H
ol
id
ay
 b
re
ak
, h
ol
id
ay
 s
ea
so
n
, a
n
d 
co
m
pa
ri
so
n
 p
er
io
d
D
ec
em
be
r
J
an
u
ar
y
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Table 1.6  Effects of Holiday Break (HB) on birth numbers in Holiday Season (HS) 
 
T
a
b
le
 1
.6
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
f 
H
o
li
d
a
y
 B
r
e
a
k
 (
H
B
) 
o
n
 b
ir
th
 n
u
m
b
e
r
s
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n
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o
li
d
a
y
 S
e
a
s
o
n
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H
S
)
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)
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)
(3
)
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)
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)
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)
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)
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)
A
ll
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C
-s
e
c
ti
o
n
V
a
g
in
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d
u
c
ti
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d
u
c
e
d
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e
c
ti
o
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c
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c
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c
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g
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c
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g
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B
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9
.4
0
*
*
*
-2
6
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7
*
*
*
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9
.9
6
*
*
*
-2
0
.2
0
*
*
*
-4
.2
2
7
*
*
*
-2
2
.2
9
*
*
*
-1
5
.9
5
*
*
*
-1
4
.0
2
*
*
*
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7
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)
(2
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3
6
)
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.5
0
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)
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)
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.5
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b
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0
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.8
2
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1
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0
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 D
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b
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b
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b
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*
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0
*
*
*
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2
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*
*
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9
*
*
*
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6
3
*
*
*
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.0
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9
0
*
*
*
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.0
1
6
7
)
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.0
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)
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.0
1
3
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)
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.0
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)
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)
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)
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)
(0
.0
1
1
4
)
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1
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%
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9
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%
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0
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0
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s
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o
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s
4
8
3
4
8
3
4
8
3
4
8
3
4
8
3
4
8
3
4
8
3
4
8
3
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te
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T
h
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e
g
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s
s
io
n
 i
s
 o
n
 d
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s
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e
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e
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b
u
s
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rd
 e
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 i
n
 p
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e
e
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 d
u
m
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d
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e
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 c
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n
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e
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e
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*
*
*
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<
0
.0
1
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*
*
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<
0
.0
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0
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A
R
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E
S
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n
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n
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 D
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n
d
e
n
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u
m
b
e
r 
o
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b
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th
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Table 1.7  Shifting Births: Effects of Holiday Break (HB) on different delivery methods in 
Holiday Season (HS) 
 
T
a
b
le
 1
.7
S
h
if
ti
n
g
 B
ir
th
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E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
f 
H
o
li
d
a
y
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r
e
a
k
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 d
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r
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e
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y
 m
e
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o
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n
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o
li
d
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y
 S
e
a
s
o
n
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H
S
)
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)
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)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
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)
C
-s
e
c
ti
o
n
V
a
g
in
a
l
In
d
u
c
ti
o
n
In
d
u
c
e
d
  
  
  
  
  
  
C
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e
c
ti
o
n
  
  
 
N
o
n
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n
d
u
c
e
d
  
 
C
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e
c
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o
n
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d
u
c
e
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V
a
g
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a
l 
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n
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n
d
u
c
e
d
  
  
V
a
g
in
a
l 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
P
a
n
e
l 
A
: 
T
e
rm
 +
 L
R
H
B
-2
.1
0
7
*
*
*
2
.1
1
4
*
*
*
-4
.7
5
0
*
*
*
-0
.7
4
3
*
*
*
-1
.3
5
9
*
*
*
-3
.9
8
9
*
*
*
6
.0
9
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
7
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
0
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
2
)
M
e
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n
1
6
.6
7
%
8
2
.3
6
%
1
6
.0
1
%
3
.3
4
%
1
3
.3
3
%
1
2
.5
3
%
6
9
.7
2
%
N
4
2
,4
7
5
4
2
,4
7
5
4
2
,4
7
5
4
2
,4
7
5
4
2
,4
7
5
4
2
,4
7
5
4
2
,4
7
5
P
a
n
e
l 
B
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T
e
rm
 +
 L
R
 +
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3
8
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4
0
]
H
B
-2
.4
7
9
*
*
*
2
.4
7
1
*
*
*
-4
.7
9
1
*
*
*
-0
.7
9
2
*
*
*
-1
.6
8
7
*
*
*
-3
.9
7
7
*
*
*
6
.4
4
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
4
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
2
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
7
6
)
M
e
a
n
1
6
.2
4
%
8
2
.8
5
%
1
4
.7
4
%
2
.8
3
%
1
3
.4
1
%
1
1
.8
0
%
7
0
.9
6
%
N
3
2
,2
9
0
3
2
,2
9
0
3
2
,2
9
0
3
2
,2
9
0
3
2
,2
9
0
3
2
,2
9
0
3
2
,2
9
0
P
a
n
e
l 
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T
e
rm
 +
 L
R
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3
9
, 
4
0
]
H
B
-2
.1
6
5
*
*
*
2
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7
6
*
*
*
-4
.6
9
8
*
*
*
-0
.6
9
9
*
*
-1
.4
6
6
*
*
-3
.9
9
2
*
*
*
6
.2
6
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
6
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
8
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
9
)
(0
.0
0
7
7
1
)
M
e
a
n
1
6
.1
7
%
8
2
.8
8
%
1
5
.1
2
%
3
.0
5
%
1
3
.1
2
%
1
1
.9
6
%
7
0
.8
2
%
N
2
4
,7
0
6
2
4
,7
0
6
2
4
,7
0
6
2
4
,7
0
6
2
4
,7
0
6
2
4
,7
0
6
2
4
,7
0
6
*
*
*
 p
<
0
.0
1
, 
*
*
 p
<
0
.0
5
, 
*
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<
0
.1
V
A
R
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B
L
E
S
N
o
te
s
: 
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e
u
s
lt
s
 o
f 
e
q
u
a
ti
o
n
 (
3
).
 T
h
is
 r
e
g
re
s
s
io
n
 i
s
 o
n
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
a
l 
le
v
e
l.
 A
ll
 r
e
g
re
s
s
io
n
s
 i
n
c
lu
d
e
 c
o
u
n
ty
, 
b
ir
th
 o
rd
e
r,
 
in
te
ra
c
ti
o
n
 t
e
rm
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 t
h
e
 d
a
y
 o
f 
w
e
e
k
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 y
e
a
r,
 a
n
d
 p
a
re
n
ts
 d
e
m
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
. 
R
o
b
u
s
t 
s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 e
rr
o
rs
 i
n
 
p
a
re
n
th
e
s
e
s
. 
I 
re
p
o
rt
 p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 p
o
in
t 
e
ff
e
c
ts
 f
o
r 
b
in
a
ry
 d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
.
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Table 1.8 Switching Births: Effects of Holiday Season (HS) on different delivery methods in the 
combined period of  Holiday Season (HS) period and Comparison Period (CHS) 
 
T
a
b
le
 1
.8
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
C
-s
e
c
ti
o
n
V
a
g
in
a
l
In
d
u
c
ti
o
n
In
d
u
c
e
d
  
  
  
  
  
  
C
-s
e
c
ti
o
n
  
  
 
N
o
n
-i
n
d
u
c
e
d
  
 
C
-s
e
c
ti
o
n
  
  
  
  
  
In
d
u
c
e
d
 
V
a
g
in
a
l 
  
  
  
N
o
n
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n
d
u
c
e
d
  
  
V
a
g
in
a
l 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
P
a
n
e
l 
A
: 
T
e
rm
 +
 L
R
H
S
-0
.2
8
6
0
.3
5
5
0
.2
9
5
-0
.1
6
6
-0
.1
1
6
0
.4
0
9
-0
.1
0
7
(0
.0
0
2
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
8
5
)
M
e
a
n
1
6
.8
3
%
8
2
.1
3
%
1
5
.9
1
%
3
.4
1
%
1
3
.4
1
%
1
2
.3
6
%
6
9
.6
8
%
N
1
0
5
,4
2
0
1
0
5
,4
2
0
1
0
5
,4
2
0
1
0
5
,4
2
0
1
0
5
,4
2
0
1
0
5
,4
2
0
1
0
5
,4
2
0
P
a
n
e
l 
B
: 
T
e
rm
 +
 L
R
 +
 [
3
8
, 
4
0
]
H
S
-0
.0
2
1
7
0
.0
8
4
1
0
.2
1
6
-0
.0
8
6
1
0
.0
6
9
2
0
.3
0
5
-0
.2
2
8
(0
.0
0
2
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
6
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
7
)
(0
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0
2
4
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)
(0
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0
2
4
1
)
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.0
0
3
2
3
)
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n
1
6
.6
8
%
8
2
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5
%
1
4
.6
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%
2
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%
1
3
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6
%
1
1
.6
7
%
7
1
.0
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%
N
8
0
,7
1
6
8
0
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1
6
8
0
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1
6
8
0
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1
6
8
0
,7
1
6
8
0
,7
1
6
8
0
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1
6
P
a
n
e
l 
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T
e
rm
 +
 L
R
 +
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3
9
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4
0
]
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S
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.1
2
3
0
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4
5
0
.1
7
4
-0
.0
8
0
5
-0
.0
3
9
5
0
.2
6
4
-0
.0
2
4
1
(0
.0
0
2
9
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
3
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
7
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
7
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
0
)
M
e
a
n
1
6
.3
0
%
8
2
.6
4
%
1
5
.1
2
%
3
.1
1
%
1
3
.1
9
%
1
1
.8
9
%
7
0
.6
6
%
N
6
2
,0
0
2
6
2
,0
0
2
6
2
,0
0
2
6
2
,0
0
2
6
2
,0
0
2
6
2
,0
0
2
6
2
,0
0
2
*
*
*
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<
0
.0
1
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*
*
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<
0
.0
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, 
*
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<
0
.1
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E
S
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o
te
s
: 
R
e
u
s
lt
s
 o
f 
e
q
u
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o
n
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n
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n
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e
 c
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b
ir
th
 o
rd
e
r,
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te
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o
n
 t
e
rm
 b
e
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e
e
n
 t
h
e
 d
a
y
 o
f 
w
e
e
k
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n
d
 t
h
e
 y
e
a
r,
 a
n
d
 p
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re
n
ts
 d
e
m
o
g
ra
p
h
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a
ri
a
b
le
s
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R
o
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u
s
t 
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n
d
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rd
 e
rr
o
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 i
n
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th
e
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e
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. 
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re
p
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 p
e
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e
n
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e
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 d
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Table 1.9  Parental characteristics: Correlation between Holiday Break (HB) and Parental 
characteristics in Holiday Season (HS) 
 
T
ab
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)
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h
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at
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b
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*
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*
*
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*
*
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.0
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2
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Table 1.10  Infant Health outcomes: Effects of Holiday Season (HS) on different delivery 
methods in the combined period of  Holiday Season (HS) period and Comparison Period (CHS) 
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Table 1.11 Summary statistics - Comparison of two groups (highly likely to manipulate and  
highly unlikely to manipulate babies' birth date) 
 
T le 1.1
Summary statistics - For term nd low risk irt s
Control 
group
Treatment 
group
Control 
group
Treatment 
group
Control 
group
Treatment 
group
HUL HL HUL HL HUL HL
number of birth 88,425 76,324 12,101 80,055 68,436 11,619 39,373 33,703 5,670
mother_age 29.70 29.54 30.68 29.73 29.57 30.67 29.69 29.54 30.59
mother_edu 13.70 13.63 14.15 13.71 13.64 14.15 13.71 13.63 14.16
% mother_married 77.20 76.93 78.89 77.20 76.92 78.86 76.86 76.59 78.50
% mother_black 13.51 13.52 13.45 13.65 13.68 13.49 13.66 13.73 13.23
% mother_white 75.72 75.92 74.47 75.43 75.59 74.50 75.47 75.59 74.76
% mother_hispanic 19.57 19.82 17.94 19.64 19.91 18.04 19.90 20.14 18.51
% mother_asian 8.13 7.87 9.77 8.27 8.02 9.72 8.24 7.99 9.71
% mother_alcohol 1.27 1.31 1.01 1.26 1.30 1.02 1.28 1.30 1.19
% mother_tobacco 7.43 7.56 6.59 7.37 7.50 6.58 7.42 7.58 6.49
% prenatal_visits 99.54 99.49 99.86 99.53 99.48 99.86 99.50 99.45 99.84
prenatal_visits_number 10.89 10.87 11.02 10.88 10.85 11.04 10.87 10.85 10.98
father_age 32.54 32.43 33.28 32.58 32.45 33.29 32.56 32.44 33.23
father_edu 13.80 13.75 14.08 13.80 13.75 14.08 13.80 13.75 14.09
% boy 50.18 49.83 52.34 50.35 50.02 52.32 50.09 49.69 52.45
number of children 1.88 1.90 1.75 1.88 1.90 1.76 1.87 1.89 1.74
apgar1 8.57 8.57 8.55 8.58 8.58 8.56 8.57 8.58 8.55
% apgar1 >= 7 97.27 97.35 96.77 97.33 97.42 96.80 97.25 97.35 96.61
apgar5 9.07 9.08 9.03 9.07 9.08 9.03 9.07 9.08 9.03
% apgar5 >= 7 99.79 99.79 99.80 99.79 99.79 99.81 99.80 99.79 99.81
% ventilation < 30 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09
% ventilation >= 30 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.15
% Any ventilation 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.24
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
HL: Highly likely to manipulate babies' birth date
HUL: Highly unlikely to manipulate babies' birth date
Comparison of two groups (highly likely to manipulate and  highly unlikely to manipulate babies' birth date)
Panel A Panel B Panel C
No birth time restriction
Holiday season + 
Comparison period
Holiday season
Variables
All births
All All All
[12/1 - 1/20] [12/16 - 1/5]
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Table 1.12  Parental characteristics: Correlation between parental characteristics and the 
behavior of highly likely to manipulate (HL) babies' birth date. 
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Table 1.13  Infant health outcomes: Correlation between infant health outcome and the behavior 
of highly likely to manipulate (HL) babies' birth date 
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Chapter 2: How Does Retirement Affect Health? 
Evidence from Urban People in China 
2.1 Introduction 
      With the population aging rapidly and life expectancy improving dramatically, public health 
care for the elderly and social security systems in developed and developing countries are more 
and more stressed. Very low birth rates in developed countries, coupled with birth rate declining 
in most developing countries, yield that the global share of older people (aged 60 years or over) 
increased from 9.2 percent in 1990 to 11.7 percent in 2013 and is expected to reach 21.1 percent 
by 2050 (World Population Aging 2013, United Nations). Average life expectancy at birth has 
increased globally over the past half century from 46.5 years in 1950--1955 to 65.2 years in 
2002, and it increased to 71.4 years in 2015.15 The above two striking worldwide changes of 
population structure generate an extended retirement period, and then impose several challenges, 
such as limited pension pool and shortfall of public health care for the elderly, to the financial 
sustainability of public health and social security systems.   
      In response, policymakers in many countries have encouraged aging people to work longer 
and postpone retirement. In some developed countries, they have decided to increase the normal 
retirement age, and adjust the early retirement age too. For example, the UK Pension 
Commission  in 2006 published the law to extend the state pension age for both women and men 
                                                          
15 On average, the gain in life expectancy was 9 years in developed countries (including Australia, European countries, Japan, 
New Zealand and North America), 17 years in the high-mortality developing countries (with high child and adult mortality 
levels), including most African countries and poorer countries in Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean Region and Latin America; and 
26 years in the low-mortality developing countries. (The world health report 2003, WHO) The details are available at 
http://www.who.int/whr/2003/en/whr03_en.pdf 
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from 65 to 68 in three stages between 2024 and 2046.16 In Germany, the retirement age is to be 
increased gradually and reaches 67 years in 2029.17 Similar policy changes happened in the U.S., 
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Japan etc. Even in developing countries, they are 
planning to raise the retirement age also. China has set the timeline for the gradual, multiyear 
process to increase the retirement age to 65 until 2045. 
      However, whether such policies can successfully reduce government expenditure has been 
long debated by economists. For the elderly, the better health, the less government expenditure. 
On the one hand, if retirees have less pressure after they leave their work environment, and 
would like to spend more spare time doing physical exercises and attending social activities, then 
increasing the retirement age will likely result in better health outcomes and eventually decrease 
expenditure. On the other hand, if retirees feel lonely and have worse health behaviors than the 
working people, extended retirement may lead to additional costs for individuals and the entire 
society besides increased expenditure on health care and pension. Therefore, to fully assess the 
well-being of the elderly and the welfare of society of the consequence of extending retirement 
age, it is very important to understand the relationship between retirement and health. 
      Although a number of studies have investigated the relationship between retirement and 
health, these studies focus on developed countries. In addition, few studies attempt to estimate 
the causal effects and existing results are mixed. Some find retirement has no or negative effects 
on health (Dave et al., 2008; Lindeboom, et al., 2002). Some find retirement improves self-
reported overall health, reducing depression, increasing life satisfaction, and even making 
memory better (Johnston et al., 2009; Bonsang et al., 2012; Coe et al., 2012; Eibich 2015). The 
                                                          
16 The Pensions Act 2007 (c22), Security in retirement: towards a new pension system, Department for Work and Pensions, the 
United Kingdom. The details are available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272299/6841.pdf 
17 European Commission. "2009 ageing report: economic and budgetary projections for the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060). 
The details are available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14992_en.pdf 
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main empirical complication in estimating the effect of retirement on health is the 
endogeneity problem caused by the effect of health on retirement. Recent studies exploit the 
discontinuous retirement behavior around pension eligibility age to overcome the endogeneity 
problem. However, this discontinuity is may not exist due to voluntary retirement in many 
western countries.  
      Studying China helps to exam this issue for the following reasons. First, contrary to most 
western counties, China has the mandatory retirement policy imposing uniform retirement age 
for urban workers: 55 for the male blue-collar; 60 for all other male workers; 50 for the female 
blue-collar; 55 for all female workers. These age cutoffs have not been changed since the 
implementation of the retirement system in 1951. It means that as soon as workers reach the 
retirement age, urban workers in China have no choice but to leave their current jobs, although 
they have the right to find other jobs. In this case, the change of retirement probability around the 
mandatory retirement age will be sharp. In addition, the relatively young retirement age makes 
the decision of retirement less likely to be caused by bad health. Therefore, the endogeneity 
problems could be mitigated. Furthermore, another important feature of China’s retirement 
system is that access to public health insurance does not change dramatically around the official 
retirement age, which is quite different from the system of the U.S. with the Medicare eligibility 
age 65. Therefore, it is unclear whether the conclusion about the effects of retirement on health 
drawn from the developed countries can be applied to developing counties, such as China. So 
investigating the case of China will be important and valuable to current literature. 
      In this study, I focus on the male urban workers in China. Using data from the China Health 
and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) and a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I 
investigate the retirement effects on individual’s physical, mental health, well-being and the 
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potential mechanisms driving these effects. My results show that retirement has significant and 
positive effect on mental health, well-being, life satisfaction, and cognitive functioning. Most 
importantly, the results suggest that attending more social activities, having more physical 
activities, and paying more attention to health care could be the main mechanisms through which 
retirement improves health. 
      The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature. 
Section 3 details the institutional background. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 shows the 
identification strategy and the empirical specification. Section 6 dicussess the results and 
robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.2   Previous studies  
      Although evaluating the relationship between retirement and health is an old topic, there is 
little conclusive empirical evidence thus far. The culturally dependent retirement policy might be 
the first reason. In addition, many of the early studies compare individuals’ health before and 
after retire. since they may not address the endogeneity problem of retirement, researchers 
following this methodology can only infer correlations, not causality. Some of the studies find 
retirement has no correlation with health (Adams and Lefebvre, 1981), some find a positive 
correlation with health (Thompson and Streib, 1958; Mein et al., 2003), and some others find a 
negative correlation with health (Casscells et al., 1980; Gonzales, 1980; Dave et al., 2006).  
      Some existing studies try to solve the endogeneity of retirement decision in examining the 
future health. The first group of literature uses the panel data to control for endogeneity. For 
example, Using the panel data from two waves of a survey of Dutch elderly and applying fixed 
effects method, Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1997) account for the time-invariant factors that may 
 62 
 
confound the results, and find that health deteriorates with increased working effects and that 
increasing retirement age may negatively influence late-life health outcomes. However, they do 
not control the time-varying factors, such as income and socioeconomic conditions. Dave et al., 
(2008) explore seven waves (spanning from 1992 through 2005) of longitudinal study in the U.S. 
(the Health and Retirement Study), to estimate the effects of retirement on health status such as 
indicators of physical and functional limitations, illness conditions, and depression. The 
conclusion shows that complete retirement may have unfavorable effects on mobility, illness 
conditions, and mental health. However, these estimates may also be biased if some 
unobservable time-varying factors can influence both retirement decision and health.  
      Another group of studies use instrumental variables (IV), using instruments based on social 
security eligibility ages or other exogenous variation in retirement regulations. For example. 
using a group of binary variables indicating early and normal retirement age, as well as 
retirement policy changes in the 1980s as instrumental variables, Charles (2004) shows that 
retirement improves the psychological well-being of males in the U.S. Similarly, Neuman (2008) 
uses extended set of age dummies and categorical age variables as instruments showing that 
health impact of retirement may be positive. Using European 11 countries-specific early and full 
time retirement ages as instruments to exam the effects on retirement on self-reported health, 
mental health and cognitive ability, Coe and Gema (2011) find that retirement affects general 
health significantly. However, using HRS data and eligibility age for social security as an 
instrument, Bonsang et al, (2012) highlight a significant unfavorable effect of retirement on 
cognitive functioning measures. Interestingly, using same data set HRS, but using offers of early 
retirement windows as instruments, Coe et al, (2012) find a favorable effect of retirement 
duration on later-life cognition for blue-collar workers. 
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      Other studies exploit the discontinuity of retirement status around the official retirement age 
set by governments. If this discontinuity of retirement is significant, and all factors but retirement 
are smooth around the official retirement, RDD (regression discontinuity design) may have the 
potential to identify the short-term causal effects of retirement on health. For example, Johnston 
and Lee (2009) uses a RDD based on the discontinuity at age 65 in the probability of retirement 
in England to estimate the impact of retirement on subjective and objective health. Their results 
indicate that retirement increases an individual’s sense of well-being and their mental health. In 
German pension system, 60 is the pension eligibility age for women, for unemployment and 
partial retirement, and for severely disabled people; age 65 is the standard pension age. Using a 
RDD and two pension ages as cutoffs, Eibich (2015) identifies the causal effects of retirement on 
health and the mechanisms behind the effects, and finds that retirement improves subjective 
health status and mental health, while reduces outpatient care utilization. Relieving from work-
related stress, increased sleep duration, as well as frequent physical activities seem to be key 
mechanisms through which retirement affects health. However, since the retirement behavior is 
voluntary in developed counties relative to developing countries, sometimes the discontinuity of 
retirement status of developed countries is not sharp enough to apply RDD approach. In addition, 
there may have other significant changes around retirement age for elderly. For example, age 65 
is also the Medicare eligibility cutoff in the U.S. This health insurance availability may 
confound, or cause impact of the retirement to be biased upward.  
      A recent small group of studies has begun estimating the impact of retirement on health-
related behaviors, such as social activities, smoking and drinking status, preventive health 
behaviors and so on. Zhao et al, (2013) indicate that individuals increase participation into 
regular exercising and drinking, yet reduce smoking intensity significantly after retirement. 
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Insler (2014) shows that a reduction in smoking and an increase in physical activity as potential 
incentive to invest in their health.   
      There are few relevant empirical studies in China. Using one percent population survey, Lei 
et al, (2010) identified a short-term causal effect of retirement on health by exploring China’s 
mandatory retirement policy with a RDD. They find that retirement has an immediate negative 
effect on self-reported health status. However, limited by less information, they could not exam 
other objective health outcomes, mental health, and potential channels deriving these effects.  
 
2.3 Retirement Policy in China 
      There are two public pension systems in China: a formal system, under which urban 
employees receive generous pensions and face mandatory retirement by age 60, and an informal 
system, under which rural residents and urban residents in the informal sector rely on family 
support when they retire and always have much longer working lives. 
 
2.3.1 History 
      China’s first retirement system was established in the 1951 under the State Council’s 
Regulations on Labor Insurance. Since then, China’s pension system has gone through several 
stage of reform as the dramatically change of economics and social environment.  
      In the beginning, the system only covered government employees and urban workers in state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) on a pay-as-you-go basis. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976), management of enterprise pensions became the responsibility of individual firms: each 
enterprise paid the pensions of its own retirees out of its current revenue, while government 
employees continued to obtain their pension from central government. Because there was almost 
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no private businesses and self-employment at that time, the retirement system covered all urban 
workers. Any urban workers who started working at least ten years (the minimum number of to 
qualify for a pension) before the retirement age would qualify for the pension (in the state sector, 
the retirement age was strictly enforced: anyone who reaches retirement age must apply for the 
process of retirement and end their current employment). 
      Soon after Deng Xiaoping in 1978 opened China to foreign businesses that wanted to invest 
in the country, the government began to redevelop the social security system, including 
reintroducing a unified pension pooling system in 1986. However, increasingly intense market 
competition during the transition from a planned economy to a market economy made the 
revenue of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) fall below their expenditure. In addition, the 
government also realized it would have difficulty attaining the pension burden of public 
employees. At the same time, more and more private business and self-employed sprouted over. 
Therefore, the government began to lay the foundations of the “basic pension system” for urban 
workers in the early 1990s. In 1997, government initiated a transition from the old pay-as-you-go 
plan to a two-tiered system consisting of a scaled-back pay-as-you-go benefit and a personal 
retirement account, and still in this year all urban enterprise (private and self-employed) 
employees were required to participate the retirement pension system. At present, with a small 
part of contributions are in individual accounts, county- or city- level governments administer the 
pension pools. For rural resident and urban resident without jobs, the new rural pension system 
has been implemented since 2009, the participation is voluntary, and operational matters are left 
to local governments.18 
                                                          
18 Staring from 2009, each rural resident pays 55 RMB (China currency) a month (equivalent to $8.50 USD) to participate, and 
after age 60 (for all female and male), residents receive 100 RMB ($15.00 USD) to 500 ($80.00) RMB a month. These residents 
do not require exiting from their work (agricultural activities) to claim it. Government officials have indicated that they expect 
the scheme to cover 10 percent of rural regions by the end of 2009, about 50 percent by 2012, and 100 percent by 2020 (China 
News, 2009). 
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2.3.2 Modern System for urban employees 
      For formal sector employees (Public service employee and Urban employee), China has 
some of world’s youngest official retirement ages, and these ages have not changed since the 
starting of the retirement system in 1951. Table 2.1 shows detailed information. 
      Even with China’s low official retirement age, substantial retirement happens even earlier. 
First, policy allows early retirement due to health reasons and hazardous work conditions. For 
example, blue-collar women can be retired at 45 if they work underground for 10 years. Second, 
some evidences show that a part of local government grant early retirement liberally to get 
available positions to hire young workers or to promote current employees.19 Another special 
circumstance leading to early exit from work is known as internal retirement, especially for 
enterprise employee. This is the special practice during 1990s when many firm experienced 
financial difficulties. Firms let redundant workers exit from workplace before the normal 
retirement age with a tiny living wage or without any wage, but the firm continues to support 
workers payment of pensions to maintain workers eligibility for social insurance after they reach 
the formal retirement age. Many employees would like to accept the internal retirement since 
their total income would increase if they get another job.20 In addition, rural migrant workers are 
not generally covered by the urban pension system.21 
 
                                                          
19 For instance, some local governments set local retirement policy for public service (government and institution) employee that 
they can “leave then retire”. It means they can leave the workplace before the normal retirement age with guaranteed same or 
even better salary and benefits, and then process the retirement after they reach the formal retirement age. 
20 Since if they get a new job after they internal retire, the new employer do not need to pay 20% employer contribution to social 
retirement pool, and they do not need to pay 8% of individual salary to social retirement pool either. 
21 Migrant works are approximately 150 million in China. Participation of pension is allowed, but not compulsory. Both 
employers and rural migrant workers are reluctant to join, because joining entails higher labor costs for employers and migrant 
workers are more interested in immediate wages than in pensions. What's more, their high mobility across regions impedes 
participation. 
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2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Data source 
      This paper uses the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) national 
baseline survey wave1 and wave2 to analyze the effect of retirement on health measurements and 
lifestyle habits. The China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) is a nationally 
representative longitudinal survey of the middle-aged and elderly of China, that is, of persons 45 
years of age or older.22 Wave 1 was fielded in 2011 and includes about 10,000 households and 
17,500 individuals in 150 counties/districts and 450 villages/resident committees. Wave 2 is the 
following up survey after 2 years. 
      The CHARLS baseline data shows three major advantages over other existing Chinese 
datasets.23 First, the CHARLS is nationally representative, which many other related surveys in 
China are not. Second, it is publicly available and harmonized with many international surveys, 
making cross-study results comparable. Last, the CHARLS questionnaire covers an extensive set 
of topics: demographics, family structure/transfer, health status and functioning, biomarkers, 
health care and insurance, work, retirement and pension, income and consumption, assets 
(individual and household), and community level information. These rich data allow us to study 
the connection between retirement and the related health outcomes. 
                                                          
22 CHARLS is designed after the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the United States, and is also harmonized with many 
leading international surveys of elderly people in other countries, such as the English Longitudinal Survey on Aging (ELSA), the 
Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging (KLoSA), the Longitudinal Aging Study in India (LASI), the Survey on Health, Aging, and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and the Japanese Study of Aging and Retirement (JSTAR). All data in CHARLS are maintained 
at the National School of Development of Peking University and will be requested accessible to researchers around the world at 
the study website: http://charls.ccer.edu.cn/en /. 
23 The Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey (CLHLS) conducted by Duck University is publicly available, but it is 
not nationally representative and has the different survey design compared to the HRS in the U.S. In addition, it has less 
economic variables such as asset, debts and consumptions. Study on Global Ageing and Adult Health (SAGE) is a series of global 
surveys on the aged by World Health Organization. China part has less observations, and lack variables related to income, wealth, 
and working status. The most famous household survey of the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) does not focus on 
elders, and only collected data from nine provinces. 
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      I then construct data as below. First, I eliminate those individuals who have never worked at 
least three months in his/her life and those who have not worked since age 50, either because of 
personal choice or physical or mental problems. Second, I restrict my analysis to the sample with 
urban “hukou” (household registration status) status because of two distinct retirement patterns 
(one for urban people and another one for rural people) in China. Third, I continue to limit my 
analysis to male respondents to avoid potential confounding of female labor force participation, 
which presents very different pattern from male caused by different retirement policy. Fourth, I 
keep individuals who are between 55 and 65 years. This short age restriction around male formal 
retirement age 60 enable us to estimate the short run retirement effects on health outcomes and 
lifestyles. To make the sample size larger, I pooled the CHARLS national baseline wave1 and 
wave 2. The final sample include 1083 individuals and 1588 observations. 
 
2.4.2 Variables 
      In order to obtain a rich picture, I estimate effects of retirement on various outcomes: 
physical and mental health, well-being, cognitive functioning, and the potential mechanisms for 
these conditions, such as change in health-related behavior and life style. The sample is restricted 
to urban man aged 55 to 65 years who were born between 1946 and 1958 and who were in job 
market or retired. Table 2.2 provides the descriptive statistics for all the variables discussed 
below. Column 1 and 2 show the overall mean and standard deviation of the variable. Column 3 
to 5 give the overall minimum, maximum and the number of observations. Column 6 provides 
the mean for retirees (treatment group). The means for non-retirees (control group) are given in 
column 7. Column 8 indicates the t-statistic for the equality of means of both groups. 
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      Definition of retirement: In general, retirement implies that an individual leaves his/her job 
and ceases working. There are three main definitions used in the literature. First is self-reported 
retirement status, the second is that person is not in the paid labor market, and the third is that the 
person is not in the labor market. However, I define individuals as “retired” if they report not to 
work or work less than 3 hours per month in the last year. Although in China some retirees 
officially leave their main occupation, they may continue to work either full or part time in other 
occupations with pay or without pay. This group of people should not be considered as “retired” 
in this paper since they meet co-workers, may have less leisure time, and should have different 
life style with the group of people who totally leave the labor market. To estimate the effect of 
working status on health related outcomes, I set this group of people as not retired. 
      Physical health: Self-rated health status is derived from a question asking the individual to 
rate their health on a five-point scale: very good, good, fair, bad and very bad.24 I then condense 
these responses to a two-point scale: one is bad health (bad and very bad categories), zero is 
good health (very good, good and fair categories). 25  Activities of daily living (ADLs) and 
Instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) measure limitations in some daily skills.26 The 
number of chronic diseases is a count of diseases an individual might have.27 Mobility limitation 
measures whether the response is able to run or jogging about 1 km; to get up from a chair after 
sitting for a long period; to climb several flights of stairs without resting; to stoop, kneel, or 
crouch; to reach or extend the arms above shoulder level; and to pick up a small coin from a 
table. Number of doctor visit in last month measures outpatient health utilization. 
                                                          
24The CHARLS also records the second version of the five-point scale (excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor). We do not use 
this second version in the paper. 
25 In Chinese language, “fair” always means good 
26 ADLs measure skills of dressing, bathing, eating, transferring (get into or out of bed), toilet use (including getting up and 
down), and controlling urination and defecation. IADLs measure skills of doing housework; preparing meals; groceries shopping; 
making phone calls; taking medications (preparing and taking correct dose); and managing money (paying bills, keeping track of 
expenses, or managing assets). 
27 14 diseases: high blood pressure; high cholesterol; diabetes; cancer; chronic lung diseases; liver disease; heart problems; stroke; 
kidney disease; stomach disease; psychiatric problems; memory-related disease, arthritis; asthma. 
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      Mental health: A depression index shows the score of the 10-item Center for the 
Epidemiological Studies of Depression Short Form (CES-D-10) that ask interviewees to rate how 
often over the past week they experienced symptoms associated with depression, such as restless 
sleep, feeling fearful, and feeling lonely. Response options range from zero to three for each item 
(zero = Rarely or None of the Time, one = Some or Little of the Time, two = Moderately or 
Much of the time, three = Most or Almost All the Time). Scores range from 0 to 30, with high 
scores indicating greater depressive symptoms. A score of 10 or greater is considered depressed. 
      Well-being: HWB12, a newly developed well-being measure (Jacqui Smith and Arthur 
Stone, 2011) is a set of the 12 overall experiences of hedonic well-being occurring during the 
previous day. It asks interviewee to rate how often over the last day they experienced symptoms 
associated with positive feelings (happy, enthusiastic and content); negative feeling (frustrated, 
sad, angry, stressed, worried, depressed) and fatigue feelings (tired, lonely, bored, and pain). 
Response options range from zero to four for each item (0 = Not at all, 1 = A little, 2 = 
Somewhat, 3 = Quite a bit, 4 = Very). 28 Satisfactory life is measured using responses to a 
question asking the individual to rate on their life on a five-point scale: completely satisfied, 
very, somewhat satisfied, not very satisfied and not at all satisfied. I then condense these 
responses to an indicator: 1 is satisfied (completely satisfied, very, somewhat satisfied), 0 is not 
satisfied (not very satisfied and not at all satisfied). 
      Cognitive functioning: For cognitive functioning, I consider measures of, immediate, 
delayed and total word recall, date recall, working memory, short-term memory and self-rated 
memory.29 I also combined the scores from both immediate and delayed word recall to obtain an 
                                                          
28 For positive feelings, scores runs from 0 to 12 with high scores indicating grater positive feeling. For negative feelings, scores 
runs from 0 to 20 with low scores indicating greater depressive symptoms. In addition, for fatigu feelings, scores runs from 0 to 
16 with low scores indicating greater depressive symptoms. 
29 Immediate and delayed word recall aim at assessing memory performance based on words recall test. The score for immediate 
word recall counts the number of correct responses, leading to a test score between 0 and 10. Roughly 5 min later (after the 
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overall summary measure for recall (total word recall), whose score ranges from 0 to 20. Date 
recall aim at assessing memory performance based on the number of correct answers about the 
date today (year, month, day), the day of the week, the current season, leasing to a score between 
0 and 5. Working memory is the ability to process and store information simultaneously.30 Short-
term memory is the capacity for holding, but not manipulating, a small amount of information in 
mind in an active, readily available state for a short period.31 I translated verbal responses to 
Self‐rated memory to an indicator 1 is poor (poor category) and 0 is good (including excellent, 
very good, good, fair categories). 
      Health behavior and lifestyle measures: The CHARLS data contains several measures of 
health behavior. My analysis exploits a series of measures like the attitude to their health, 
smoking, alcohol consumption, the sleeping duration, as well as the status of social activities 
participation. 32  For social activities, the data shows the status of attending some specific 
activities. In this paper, I focus on the activities such as took care of grandchildren, interacted 
with friends, engaged in leisure activities (Ma-jong, played chess, played cards, or went to 
community club), suffered internet and did voluntary or charity work. These activities can 
enhance mental health. Furthermore, sports activities definitely improve physical health.  
       Covariates: To check the heterogeneous effect, I include major socioeconomic status (SES) 
variables, such as education, number of children and income.33 I use per capita expenditure as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
administration of some additional survey instruments), the respondent is again asked to recall as many words from the previously 
read list of nouns. Again, corresponding test score is obtained as the sum of each correct answer (delayed word recall, range 0–
10). 
30 It is assessed based on a serial 7s subtraction test. In the serial 7s test, respondents are asked to subtract 7 from 100 and 
continue subtracting 7 from each subsequent number for a total of five trials. This test thus requires respondents to perform a 
basic arithmetic operation (subtracting 7) while memorizing the result from the previous subtraction that is required as an input in 
this process. The serial 7s subtraction test score counts each correct subtraction, leading to scores between 0 and 5. 
31 It is assessed based on whether the respondent can draw the picture or failed to draw after you show the picture of two 
pentagons overlapped, leading to scores 1 (success) or 0 (failure). 
32 Attitude to their health is captured by a dummy variable that takes on the value “1” if an individual took physical exam in the 
past two years. Smoking and alcohol consumption are captured by two indicators individually. Respondents also answer how 
long they typically sleep on a regular weekday. 
33 Three groups measure education attainment: individuals who did not finished middle school, finished middle school but did not 
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proxy of income because income is measured with much more error and per capita expenditure is 
a better measure of long-run resources. 
 
2.5 Empirical Strategy 
      The sharp change in retirement probability generated by mandatory retirement policy 
provides us an excellent opportunity to use a fuzzy RDD (Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee and 
Lemieux 2010) to analyze the health effects of retirement. My identification strategy is similar 
with studies using an RD design to examine the effect of turning pension eligible age 65 in the 
U.S. (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 2004, 2009; Chay, Kim, and Swaminathan 2010). In China, the 
change at age 60 only reflects retirement status rather than the combined effects of change in any 
insurance coverage and benefit generosity (Medicare). Figure 2.1 shows the share of retirees at 
every age between 55 and 75 for all urban male in China. The dots indicate bins of 3 months. It 
presents a sharp discontinuity around age 60, the probability of retirement increases by about 20-
23% points from 38% just below the age 60 to about 61% just above the age 60. It also presents 
that there are already a few retirees before 50, the probability of retirement increases by 27 % 
from 50 to 60, but the retirement status does not change dramatically around the early retirement 
age 55.34 
      Before I move to the RDD results, I present two main RDD validity check (Imbens and 
Lemieux 2008). The first is whether the forcing variable, age, is smooth around the cutoff age 
60. It means whether the individual manipulate their age. Although the actual age cannot be 
manipulated, and the age I are using is calculated from their reported birth date, the measurement 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
finished college degree and got at least a college degree. 
34 Appendix Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the share of retirees at every age between 55 and 75 for male and rural male in China 
separately. Figure 1 presents that the retirement rate slightly increase as age increased from 45 and 60, and there is 6% jump just 
below and just above 60, then the retirement rate continue increase, and finally increase dramatically after around 68. Urban 
male’s retirement status mainly drives this 6% discontinuity in retirement status.  
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error caused by misreporting will threaten my identification strategy. Panel (a) of Figure 2.1 
shows a histogram of age for the entire range in bins of 2 years. Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows the 
McCrary (2008) density test of the jump at cutoff. Neither graph shows the density of age just 
above and just below the cutoff is significant. They support the validity of my method.  
      The second test is whether the observed characteristics are continuous around the cutoff. If 
there is no significant discontinuity around age 60 on these characteristics that may confound the 
effect from retirement, the RDD method will be valid. Figure 2.3 panel (a) and (b) show the 
continuity of various characterizes I check for. The dots in the scatter plot depict the average 
over 3 months bin. Panel (a) of Figure 2.3 show the number of children, whether only one child, 
marital status and educational categories, none of the graph shows significant jumps at the cutoff 
age 60. However, I do find a small discontinuity in total expenditure per household member at 
age 60, showed on panel (b) of Figure 2.3. This may reflect that retirees change the life style in 
China, they spend more on food, traveling, and even utilities after retired. Change of expenditure 
may be a channel through which change health-related behaviors to affect the health-related 
outcomes. Therefore, I do include the expenditure per household member in the robustness check 
model, but the results do not change dramatically. Therefore, the results from McCrary test and 
the continuity of covariates strongly suggest that the assumptions of the RDD are valid in this 
setting.  
      My research design exploits the fact that retirement status is discontinuous function of a 
person’s age. Consider the following model of the relationship between outcomes (Yit) and 
retirement status (Rit):  
0 1it it itY R           (1) 
      Specifically, I estimate the following model:
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0 1 (age)it it it itY R f L                   (2) 
Where Yit is the outcome variable of interest for observation i in time t, such as self-reported 
health, number of chronic diseases, sleeping time and so on. Rit is an indicator of retirement. 
 is a smooth function of age. Lit are location and survey years fixed effect, and  is an 
unobserved error component. My parameter of interest is the coefficient . Other controls 
include the interviews survey year and region variables. By choosing the suitable bandwidth with 
a linear control function (a linear in age, fully interacted with post dummy as the baseline 
specification), I estimate a local linear regression. I follow the algorithm proposed by (Imbens 
and Kalyanaraman 2012) to calculate an optimal bandwidth for each regression. As robustness 
checks, I change the sample to different age window (a bandwidth of 1 year to 3 years), and 
include quadratic terms in age, fully interacted with the post dummies in the model. 
  
2.6  Results and Robustness Check 
       Table 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 show the estimated effects of retirement on physical health, well-
being and mental health, and cognitive functioning, separately. Column (5) of table 2.3 show that 
retirement makes the number of physical mobility problems decreased by 1.545, which is about 
22.07% of the total seven physical mobility problems. The estimated coefficients for self-
assessed health status, problems of ADL, problems of IADL, the number of chronic diseases and 
the number of doctor visit last month are not significant. As I change the bandwidth from 1 year 
to 3 years, the magnitude of coefficient of the number of physical mobility problems do not 
change significantly.  
      Table 2.4 indicates the coefficients of well-being and mental health variables. Column (1) 
represents the retirement significantly increased individual’s self-reported life satisfaction. 
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Column (4) represents the retirement significantly relieved the feeling of fatigue. Column (5) 
shows the retirement decrease depression index by 5.246 points, which is about 17.48% of full 
depression index, or about 1.2 standard deviations. Column (6) shows the corresponding 
probability of being depressed decreased by 59 percentage points. Those coefficients are still 
significant as I adjust the bandwidth. 
      Table 2.5 shows the effects of the retirement on various cognitive functioning outcomes. 
Column (1)  represents that the retirement makes the number of immediate word recall increased 
by 1.838, which is about 18.38% of the total number of words (10 words) responders need to 
recall. In addition, this effect is consistent and significant when I choose different bandwidths. 
The estimated coefficients of other cognitive functioning such as delayed word recall, date recall, 
serial 7 substation, draw assigned picture and self-rated memory are not significant. The 
corresponding discontinuity showed by Figure 3 is presented in Appendix. 
      Overall, the results indicate that the retirement improve ability of physical mobility, the 
mental health, and cognitive functioning of immediate word recall. These findings are consistent 
with the results of Johnston and Lee (2009) and Blake and Garrouste (2012). 
      Table 2.6 presents the effects of retirement on people’s attitude to health, health related 
behaviors and other social activities, through which the physical health, mental health and 
cognitive functioning be changed. I do not find significant effects on the probability of smoking, 
the sleeping duration, and the alcohol consumption. Column (6) shows the probability of 
attending any social activities increases by 39.3 percentage points, which is about 0.84 standard 
deviation. In particular, column (9), (10), (12) and (13) shows that people are more likely to 
participate in physical activities, leisure activities, and surfing internet, even stock investment. 
After the retirement, they spend increased free time to attend leisure activities and to participate 
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in physical exercise, which potentially contribute back to their mental and physical health. The 
corresponding discontinuity showed by Figure 4 is presented in Appendix. 
       I take robustness check by adding quadratic age trend to age smooth function, and by adding 
a set of individual covariates, including education, marriage status, number of children, and 
average expenditure per year per household member. Table 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 show the effects of 
retirement on physical health, well-being and mental health and cognitive functioning, and 
potential mechanisms separately. The effect on number of physical mobility problems and 
mental health are still exist, but less significant. Column (1) of table 2.9 shows the effects of 
retirement on immediate word recall become less significant. The effects of retirement on 
delayed word recall presented on column (2) of table 2.9 become significant in 10% level. The 
effects of retirement on total recall presented on column (3) of table 2.9 become significant in 
10% level. The effects of retirement on potential mechanisms showed on table 2.10 are very 
robust. It supports that people change their life style after the retirement: engage more leisure 
activities and participating physical exercises, which potentially contribute back to their mental 
and physical health. 
 
2.7 Conclusion  
      This paper exploits China’s mandatory retirement policy to investigate the short-term effects 
of retirement on health related outcomes and the mechanisms behind these effects, using a 
comprehensive, nationally representative sample from the China Health and Retirement 
Longitudinal Study (CHARLS). The results indicate that retirement could have positive effects 
on mental health, improving self-reported life satisfaction, reducing depression and feeling of 
fatigue in short run. However, I do not find statistically significant effects of retirement on 
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several physical health measurements and many memory-related health outcomes such as the 
number of physical mobility problems and the number of immediate word recall.  
      Furthermore, the investigation on health behaviors and participation of social activities 
suggests the important mechanisms through which retirement affects health: retirees use their 
additional spare time to have a more active lifestyle by having more daily activities, attending 
more leisure activities and exercising more frequently. 
      Because the change of health behaviors and participation of social activities may take time to 
affect retirees’ physical health and cognitive functioning, estimating these effects in a long 
timeframe should be more appropriate, but not considered in this study due to data limitation. 
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2.9 Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 2.1  Share of Retirees of all urban male in China 
 
 
Notes: The markers represent the share of retirees in the window of three month. The solid line represents the 
predicted values of a local linear smoother estimated using raw data on each side of the threshold at age 60. Outer 
gray lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2.2 Density test 
 
 
(a) Global Histogram 
 
 
(b)  McCray Test 
Notes: Is the density of age continues at 60? Panel (a) shows histogram of age for the full range age in current data 
in 2 years bin. The graph in Panel (b) shows the McCrary (2008) test of whether there is a discontinuity in the 
density of age around 60. 
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Figure 2.3  Discontinuity checks for other observed characteristics 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
Notes: Ppanel (a) 
and (b) show the 
continuity of various 
characterizes I check for. The dots in the scatter plot depict the average over 3 months bin. 
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Table 2.2   Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. N 
Mean  of                     
non-
retirees 
Mean of 
retirees 
t-
Statistic 
A. Physical health 
        
 
Self-reported health 0.157 0.364 0 1 1295 0.095 0.216 (-6.04) 
 
ADL Activities of daily 
living 
0.166 0.704 0 6 1545 0.086 0.256 (-4.73) 
 
IADL Instrumental activities 
of daily living  
0.212 0.754 0 5 1544 0.130 0.303 (-4.53) 
 
Number of Chronic diseases 1.482 1.487 0 11 1495 1.313 1.686 (-4.86) 
 
Number of morbidity 
problems 
0.743 1.272 0 7 1328 0.595 0.886 (-4.19) 
 
Doctor visits in last month 0.339 1.558 0 30 1320 0.280 0.398 (-1.37) 
          B. Mental health 
        
 
Mental health 4.915 4.358 0 23 1390 4.879 4.965 (-0.37) 
 
Depression 0.147 0.354 0 1 1390 0.149 0.145 (0.17) 
          C. Well-being 
        
 
Satisfactory life 0.909 0.287 0 1 1359 0.914 0.903 (0.67) 
 
Somewhat satisfied life 0.690 0.463 0 1 1359 0.678 0.702 (-0.95) 
 
Not very satisfied life 0.079 0.269 0 1 1359 0.073 0.086 (-0.84) 
 
Not at all satisfied 0.012 0.108 0 1 1359 0.013 0.011 (0.30) 
 
Positive feeling  HWB-12 2.708 2.723 0 12 719 2.681 2.754 (-0.35) 
 
Negative feeling  HWB-12 0.972 2.241 0 17 725 0.877 1.094 (-1.29) 
 
Fatigue feeling HWB-12 1.134 1.746 0 12 723 1.170 1.076 (0.72) 
          D. Cognitive functioning 
        
 
Immediate word recall 4.719 1.606 0 10 1351 4.614 4.834 (-2.51) 
 
Delayed word recall 3.747 1.895 0 9 1358 3.706 3.792 (-0.83) 
 
Total word recall 8.492 3.164 0 18 1349 8.344 8.655 (-1.80) 
 
Date recall 4.172 1.496 0 5 1514 4.035 4.330 (-3.83) 
 
Serial 7 subtraction 3.928 1.586 0 5 1313 3.952 3.913 (0.45) 
 
Draw assign picture 0.874 0.332 0 1 1382 0.881 0.870 (0.61) 
 
Self-reported memory 0.149 0.356 0 1 1397 0.156 0.144 (0.64) 
          E. Health related behaviors 
        
 
Physical exam in past 2 years 0.585 0.493 0 1 1522 0.559 0.613 (-2.13) 
 
Alcohol consumption 0.590 0.492 0 1 1544 0.603 0.578 (1.00) 
 
Smoking 0.460 0.499 0 1 1218 0.464 0.457 (0.25) 
 
Sleeping duration 7.042 1.760 1 15 1410 7.030 7.044 (-0.15) 
          F. Social activities 
        
 
Take care grandchildren 0.647 0.478 0 1 1109 0.634 0.664 (-1.04) 
 
Attending some activities 0.676 0.468 0 1 1418 0.639 0.717 (-3.12) 
 
Number of activities 1.306 1.309 0 8 1418 1.212 1.409 (-2.83) 
 
Interacted with friends 0.362 0.481 0 1 1558 0.342 0.390 (-1.97) 
 
Leisure activities                                           0.297 0.457 0 1 1558 0.271 0.329 (-2.50) 
 
sports, social club 0.177 0.382 0 1 1558 0.130 0.236 (-5.46) 
 
Voluntary or charity work 0.022 0.146 0 1 1558 0.021 0.024 (-0.37) 
 
Stock investment 0.022 0.148 0 1 1558 0.012 0.033 (-2.81) 
 
Used the internet 0.112 0.315 0 1 1558 0.102 0.125 (-1.44) 
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G. Covariates 
        
 
Age 59.954 2.879 55 65 1558 59.103 60.906 (-12.91) 
 
Number of children 2 1.002 0 8 1332 1.900 1.792 (1.94) 
 
Only one child 0.412 0.492 0 1 1306 0.402 0.422 (-0.72) 
 
Marriage 0.954 0.209 0 1 1337 0.963 0.944 (1.61) 
 
Middle school 0.294 0.456 0 1 1338 0.298 0.287 (0.47) 
 
High school 0.516 0.500 0 1 1338 0.511 0.520 (-0.32) 
 
Some collage 0.158 0.365 0 1 1338 0.148 0.173 (-1.23) 
 
Graduate 0.031 0.174 0 1 1338 0.043 0.021 (2.28) 
 
Own house 0.967 0.178 0 1 1257 0.976 0.960 (1.54) 
  
Log of yearly average 
expenditure per household 
member 
9.173 0.909 3.549 12.479 1270 9.047 9.302 (-5.03) 
Notes: Descriptive statistics for CHARLS waves 2012 and 2014. The sample is restricted to urban man aged 55 to 65 
years who were born between 1946 and 1958 and who were in job market or retired. Column 1 and 2 show the overall 
mean and standard deviation of the variable. Column 3 to 5 gives the overall minimum, maximum and the number of 
observations. Column 6 provides the mean for retirees (treatment group). The means for non-retirees (control group) 
are given in column 7. Column 8 indicated the t-statistic for the equality of means of both groups.  
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Table 2.3 The effect of retirement on physical health 
  
VARIABLES 
Physical Health 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Self-
Assessed 
Health 
Status 
# of 
Difficulties of 
ADL 
(Activities of 
daily living) 
# of 
Difficulties of 
IADL 
(Instrumental 
activities of 
daily living) 
# of 
Chronic 
diseases 
# of 
physical 
mobility 
problems 
# of doctor 
visit last 
month 
dummy  
0-6  0-5 0-11 0 - 7 0 - 30 1 is good;       
0 is bad 
Optimal Bandwidth -0.116 -0.0421 -0.0959 -0.294 -1.545** -0.889 
  (0.289) (0.563) (0.484) (0.597) (0.601) (0.835) 
  2.566 3.01 3.18 3.63 3.519 3.681 
    
     
Bandwidth size 1 
year 
-0.431 0.321 0.735* -2.133*** -1.334*** -1.862** 
  (0.278) (0.521) (0.412) (0.756) (0.494) (0.756) 
  274 308 309 302 277 276 
    
     
Bandwidth size 2 
years 
-0.217 0.141 0.409 -0.472 -1.920*** -1.139 
  (0.319) (0.558) (0.387) (0.720) (0.636) (1.003) 
  538 647 648 600 551 548 
    
     
Bandwidth size 3 
years 
-0.101 -0.0408 -0.0399 -0.0742 -1.545** -0.980 
  (0.277) (0.563) (0.478) (0.639) (0.602) (0.899) 
  805 916 919 896 824 820 
Note: Separate regressions by different dependent variables using polled sample of the China Health and 
Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) wave 1 and wave 2 in 2011 and 2013. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses all clustered at age in month level. All models include a piecewise linear trends, individual – fixed 
effects and separate dummy variables for month and year of the interview. 
*    p < .01. 
      
**  p < .001 
      
***p < .000 
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Table 2.4  The effect of retirement on Well-being and Mental Health 
 
       
Variables 
Well-being Mental Health 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Satisfactory 
life 
Positive 
feeling 
index of 
HWB-12 
Negative 
feeling 
index of 
HWB-13 
Fatigue 
index of 
HWB-12 
Depression 
index 
Depressed? 
dummy 0 - 12 0 - 20 0 - 16 0 - 30 dummy 
1 is 
satisfied;       
0 is 
unsatisfied 
Larger, 
more 
positive 
feeling 
Smaller, 
less 
negative 
feeling 
Smaller, 
less fatigue 
feeling 
Smaller, 
less 
pressure 
1 is yes;       
0 is no 
Optimal Bandwidth 0.710*** 1.562 -1.908 -2.514* -5.246* -0.590** 
  (0.204) (2.279) (2.011) (1.410) (2.766) (0.243) 
  1.874 4.896 3.857 4.329 3.89 2.338 
  
      
Bandwidth size 1 
year 0.740*** 4.465 -6.552** -6.971*** -5.720** -0.255 
  (0.237) (3.231) (2.775) (2.541) (2.817) (0.183) 
  251 120 120 119 254 254 
  
      Bandwidth size 2 
years 0.706*** 5.549* -4.805** -4.943*** -7.793*** -0.636** 
  (0.200) (2.923) (2.446) (1.310) (2.840) (0.254) 
  491 254 255 254 501 501 
  
      Bandwidth size 3 
years 0.528*** 3.556 -2.989 -2.805** -5.758** -0.483** 
  (0.134) (2.463) (2.176) (1.391) (2.802) (0.214) 
  720 384 387 386 736 736 
Note: Separate regressions by different dependent variables using polled sample of the China Health and 
Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) wave 1 and wave 2 in 2011 and 2013. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses all clustered at age in month level. All models include a piecewise linear trends, individual 
– fixed effects and separate dummy variables for month and year of the interview. 
*    p < .01. 
      **  p < .001 
      ***p < .000 
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Table 2.5  The effect of retirement on cognitive 
functioning    
  
       
VARIABLES 
Cognitive functioning   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Immediate 
word recall 
Delayed 
word 
recall 
Total 
word 
recall 
Date 
recall 
Serial 7 
subtraction 
Draw 
assign 
picture 
Self-
rated 
Memory 
0 -10 1 -10 0-20 0-5 0-5 
dummy dummy 
1 is yes;               
0 is no 
1 is poor;             
0 is good 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
1.838** -0.199 1.084 0.592 0.474 0.206 -0.106 
  (0.933) (1.235) (1.461) (1.026) (0.934) (0.275) (0.364) 
  3.527 3.547 4.492 3.384 3.627 2.062 2.464 
  
       
Bandwidth size 
1 year 
2.702*** 4.176** 6.190*** 0.357 0.225 0.467 0.187 
  (0.922) (2.060) (1.505) (1.546) (1.311) (0.368) (0.252) 
  249 251 249 272 239 253 255 
  
       
Bandwidth size 
2 years 
3.470*** 2.223* 5.285*** 1.412 1.427 0.277 -0.0819 
  (1.242) (1.324) (0.862) (1.509) (1.582) (0.305) (0.400) 
  487 489 486 542 472 500 502 
  
       
Bandwidth size 
3 years 
2.208** 0.246 2.409* 0.754 0.454 0.151 -0.103 
  (0.970) (1.285) (1.324) (1.042) (0.936) (0.228) (0.337) 
  711 716 710 806 697 735 741 
Note: Separate regressions by different dependent variables using polled sample of the China Health and 
Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) wave 1 and wave 2 in 2011 and 2013. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses, all clustered at age in month level. All models include a piecewise linear trends, 
individual – fixed effects and separate dummy variables for month and year of the interview. 
*    p < .01. 
       
**  p < .001 
       
***p < .000 
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Table 2.6  Mechanisms 
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Table 2.7 Robustness Check - Piecewise quadratic age trends and Add control variables 
The effect of retirement on physical health 
VARIABLES 
Physical Health 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Self-
Assessed 
Health 
Status 
# of Difficulties 
of ADL 
(Activities of 
daily living) 
# of Difficulties 
of IADL 
(Instrumental 
activities of 
daily living) 
# of 
Chronic 
diseases 
# of 
physical 
mobility 
problems 
# of          
doctor 
visit last 
month 
dummy  
0-6  0-5 0-11 0 - 7 0 - 30 1 is good;       
0 is bad 
Bandwidth size 1 year -2.932 -0.988 0.0500 -4.864 -3.958 -3.375 
  (1.944) (1.316) (1.275) (3.265) (2.751) (2.186) 
  274 308 309 302 277 276 
  
 
   
  Bandwidth size 2 years -0.233 -0.0619 0.824 -3.639 -2.007*** 0.918 
  (0.656) (1.083) (0.843) (2.411) (0.621) (1.732) 
  538 647 648 600 551 548 
  
      Bandwidth size 3 years -0.0495 0.0231 0.326 0.356 -1.215** -0.533 
  (0.490) (0.626) (0.508) (1.147) (0.572) (1.381) 
  805 916 919 896 824 820 
Note: Separate regressions by different dependent variables using polled sample of the China Health and Retirement 
Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) wave 1 and wave 2 in 2011 and 2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses, all 
clustered at age in month level. All models include a piecewise linear trends, piecewise quadratic age trends, education 
in three categories, marital status, number of students, average expenditure per household member per year, individual – 
fixed effects and separate dummy variables for month and year of the interview. 
*    p < .01. 
      
**  p < .001 
      
***p < .000 
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Table 2.8  Robustness Check - Piecewise quadratic age trends and Add control 
variables (The effect of retirement on Well-being and Mental Health) 
    
Variables 
Well-being Mental Health 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Satisfactory 
life 
Positive 
feeling 
index of 
HWB-12 
Negative 
feeling 
index of 
HWB-13 
Fatigue 
index of 
HWB-12 
Depression 
index 
Depressed? 
dummy 0 - 12 0 - 20 0 - 16 0 - 30 dummy 
1 is 
satisfied;       
0 is 
unsatisfied 
Larger, 
more 
positive 
feeling 
Smaller, 
less 
negative 
feeling 
Smaller, 
less 
fatigue 
feeling 
Smaller, 
less 
pressure 
1 is yes;       
0 is no 
Bandwidth size 1 year 0.901 7.959 -8.628 -11.39* -12.11* -0.487 
  (1.139) (7.317) (5.625) (6.526) (6.815) (0.504) 
  251 120 120 119 254 254 
  
      Bandwidth size 2 years 0.610** 6.195 -3.546 -4.809 -10.61** -0.958** 
  (0.294) (5.342) (4.274) (3.004) (5.204) (0.414) 
  491 254 255 254 501 501 
  
      Bandwidth size 3 years 0.347 2.366 -1.610 -2.525 -7.547 -0.691 
  (0.222) (3.495) (3.074) (2.114) (5.601) (0.457) 
  720 384 387 386 736 736 
Note: Separate regressions by different dependent variables using polled sample of the China Health and 
Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) wave 1 and wave 2 in 2011 and 2013. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, all clustered at age in month level. All models include a piecewise linear trends, piecewise 
quadratic age trends, education in three categories, marital status, number of students, average expenditure 
per household member per year, individual – fixed effects and separate dummy variables for month and year 
of the interview. 
*    p < .01. 
      **  p < .001 
      ***p < .000 
       
 
 
 
 
 93 
 
 
Table 2.9 Robustness Check - Piecewise quadratic age trends and Add 
control variables (The effect of retirement on cognitive functioning) 
 
VARIABLES 
Cognitive functioning   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Immediate 
word 
recall 
Delayed 
word 
recall 
Total 
word 
recall 
Date 
recall 
Serial 7 
subtraction 
Draw 
assign 
picture 
Self-
rated 
Memory 
0 -10 1 -10 0-20 0-5 0-5 
dummy dummy 
1 is 
yes;               
0 is no 
1 is 
poor;             
0 is 
good 
Bandwidth size 
1 year 3.291* 10.35* 12.37** 0.802 1.199 0.645 -0.386 
  (1.874) (5.669) (5.427) (2.604) (3.049) (0.790) (0.672) 
  249 251 249 272 239 253 255 
  
       Bandwidth size 
2 years 5.820* 5.964* 10.44** 2.413 5.427 0.921 0.0301 
  (3.095) (3.624) (4.363) (2.024) (3.824) (0.796) (0.458) 
  487 489 486 542 472 500 502 
  
       Bandwidth size 
3 years 4.419* 1.763 5.916* 1.109 1.874 0.0655 -0.185 
  (2.435) (2.065) (3.473) (1.068) (1.463) (0.449) (0.463) 
  711 716 710 806 697 735 741 
Note: Separate regressions by different dependent variables using polled sample of the China 
Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) wave 1 and wave 2 in 2011 and 2013. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses all clustered at age in month level. All models include a 
piecewise linear trends, piecewise quadratic age trends, education in three categories, marital 
status, number of students, average expenditure per household member per year, individual – 
fixed effects and separate dummy variables for month and year of the interview. 
*    p < .01. 
       
**  p < .001 
       
***p < .000 
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Table 2.10  Robustness Check on Mechanisms: Adding Piecewise quadratic age trends and 
control variables 
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Appendix 1: 
 
Figure 1: Share of Retirees of male in China  
 
Notes: The markers represent the share of retirees in the window of three month. The solid line represents the 
predicted values of a local linear smoother estimated using raw data on each side of the threshold at age 60. Outer 
gray lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 
 
Figure 2: Share of Retirees of all rural male in China 
 
Notes: The markers represent the share of retirees in the window of three month. The solid line represents the 
predicted values of a local linear smoother estimated using raw data on each side of the threshold at age 60. Outer 
gray lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3 (health related dependent variables) 
     
    
Notes: Figure 3 shows the continuity of various health related dependent variables I check for. The dots in the 
scatter plot depict the average over 3 months bin. 
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Figure 4 (Mechanisms) 
 
 
Notes: Figure 4 shows the discontinuity of various mechanisms variables I check for. The dots in the scatter plot 
depict the average over 3 months bin. 
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Chapter 3:  The Effects of Childhood Socioeconomic 
Status on Health Outcomes of Mid-Aged and the 
Elderly in China: Evidence from the CHARLS 
National Baseline Survey and Health History Survey  
3.1 Introduction 
      Several types of research across economic, epidemiological, and sociological fields 
document that early life circumstances, such as in-uterus exposures, socio-economics, childhood 
shocks and health are powerful predictors of health, economic socioeconomic status and well-
being in later life. Some link birth situation to adult health (Barker, 1995; Godfrey and David JP 
Barker 2001; Roseboom et al., 2006; Currie and Moretti, 2007; Oreopoulos et al., 2008; Maccini 
and Yang, 2009). Some investigate the effects of the childhood socioeconomic status or health 
on disease in adulthood (Lynch et al., 1994; Gunnel et al., 1998; Dietz, 1998; Marmot et al., 
2001; Galobardes  et al., 2006; Biro et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2010). Other papers root in 
income, education and working status (Case et al., 2002; Luo and Linda, 2005; Currie, 2009), 
conclusing that situation in early life generates long-run impacts on the well-being of later life. 
Also, from a public policy standpoint, such long-lasting consequences may make potential policy 
intervention particularly important.  
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      With the population aging rapidlly and life expectancy improving dramatically, developing 
countries are facing several tough challenges from the aging population.35 Health of aging people 
and the related government spending on healthcare are two critical issues. The elderly have a 
higher risk of experiencing chronic diseases, having difficulties in activities of daily living 
(ADLs) or instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs). If governments have to transfer public 
spending from education and infrastructure investment to health care utilization for the elderly, 
economic growth and overall quality of life can be affected. However, the majority of those 
analyses examine many Western and developed countries and focus on the children’s health or 
adults’ health. Only a few papers explore the long-run effects of childhood condition on the 
elderly in developing countries (Grimard et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2012). 
      In this paper, I examine the health outcomes of mid-aged and the elderly in China, and 
investigate the effects of early life conditions on difference dimensions of health status in 
adulthood and elderhood. I also focus on the difference between men and women. To do so, I use 
recently collected data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) 
2011 national baseline wave and the 2016 history wave to document health conditions of those 
aged 45 to 80. I use the health measurements provided by the CHARLS including self-reported 
health, chronic disease indication, the number of chronic diseases, disable indicator, the number 
of difficulties of ADLs and IADLs, sleeping time and biomarker of height. I also control for the 
potential channel of health effects because early life conditions may have indirect effects through 
education, health, occupation, wealth, and other conditions, on the health in late life. I find that 
                                                          
35 World report on ageing and health (2015) shows that two thirds of the world’s older persons live in the developing regions now 
and their numbers are growing faster there than in the developed regions. The number of older persons in the less developed 
regions grew from 376 million in 2000 to 602 million in 2015 (an increase of 60 percent) and it is projected to grow by 71 
percent between 2015 and 2030, when a projected 1 billion people aged 60 years or over will reside in the less developed regions. 
Projections indicate that 1.7 billion people aged 60 years or over nearly 80 per cent of the world’s older population—will live in 
the less developed regions in 2050. 
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the effects are strong and statistically significant even when I control for an individual’s 
education and wealth. This finding suggests that the childhood situations have the impact on 
socio-economic conditions beyond adulthood and into elderhood. Also, the results indicate that 
policies aimed at improving children’s health, living conditions and SES may have long-lasting 
benefits for the individual and also for the society as a whole. 
       The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, 
Section 3 discusses conceptual issues and the empirical models, followed by section 4 describing 
the CHARLS national baseline data, health history data, and variables I use. Section 5 discusses 
the results and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.    
 
3.2 Literature review 
      The literature presenting several mechanisms, through which the childhood socioeconomic 
status (CSES) affects health in elderhood, can be summarized in two groups. Critical-period 
programming and life course models. 
      First, critical-period programing is the concept that environmental conditions in a certain 
sensitive period of life may have long-lasting and permanent effects. The term “fetal-origins 
hypothesis” has been used to represent the programing induced by circumstances experienced in 
the fetal period (Barker, 1997), and it also include the period of infancy and early childhood. It 
suggests a direct link of the conditions in utero, at birth or in early infancy to health later that 
may be independent of social class in adult life.  Specifically, there is growing evidence that 
conditions during such a critical period can change an individual’s physiology causing a 
permanent and downward shift in her health much later. Elo and Preston (1992) suggest that 
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adult height is essentially determined by events in the first three years of life, and height can 
have long-lasting negative impacts on health status (Strauss and Thomas, 2008). Using a 1958 
British birth cohort who were followed prospectively into their adult years. Case et al., (2005) 
explore the long-lasting associations between childhood health on adult health, exam 
performance, employment, and measures of socioeconomic status (SES). They show that people 
who experienced low birth weight or chronic disease when they were children had worse health, 
poor exam performance, and lower working statuses, even after controlling for parental 
background, such as education and income. Almond (2006) use 1918 Influenza Pandemic, which 
was unexpected and short, to identify the in-uterus conditions effects on late health. Using 
roughly one-third of those born in early 1919 whose mothers contracted influenza while pregnant 
as treatment group, and those born in early 1918, who had essentially zero prenatal exposure to 
the 1918 pandemic as control group, he find that children of infected mothers were more likely 
to be disabled and experienced lower, as well as less educational attainment. Currie and Walker 
(2011) investigate the introduction of E-ZPass (electronic toll collection) greatly decrease traffic 
congestion and vehicle emissions near highway toll plazas. Their results suggest that traffic 
congestion contributes significantly to adverse health conditions among infants. 
      Second is life course models, which is broader than the critical-period programing (fetal-
origins hypothesis). 36  It assumes that the physical and social hazards during gestation, 
childhood, adolescence, young adulthood and midlife may have long-term consequences for 
health during adulthood, either directly through the illness itself or indirectly by restricting 
educational achievement and life opportunities (Kuh and Wadsworth 1993; Kuh and Ben-
                                                          
36 A life course is defined as "a sequence of socially defined events and roles that the individual enacts over time". In particular, 
the approach focuses on the connection between individuals and the historical and socioeconomic context in which these 
individuals lived. The origins of this approach can be traced back to pioneering studies of the 1920s such as Thomas' and 
Znaniecki's "The Polish Peasant in Europe and America" and Mannheim's essay on the "Problem of generations". 
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Shlomo 1997). The life course models operate in two ways. The pathway models suggest that 
early experiences place an individual onto a certain "life trajectory," eventually indirectly 
impacting later life health (Kuh et al. 1997; Marmot et al. 2001; Hertzman et al. 2001).The 
cumulative model suggests the psychosocial and physiological experiences and environments 
during early, and later life accumulate to influence the late life health (Davey-Smith et al, 2002). 
Case and Paxson (2008) shows that having good health during childhood and growing up in a 
more comfortable environment result in a higher level of education, and good health and higher 
economic status later in life. 
 
3.3 Conceptual issues and empirical models 
3.3.1 Conceptual issues 
      Michael Grossman's 1972 model of health production treats every individual as both a 
producer and a consumer of health.37 Health is treated as a stock which degrades over time in the 
absence of "investments" in health. Following his model, and especially the model of Grimard et 
al., (2010), I generate the conceptual framework. I consider that individual health at time t (Ht) 
should be a function of an individual’s history health from initial health to the most recent health 
(H0, H1, …, Ht-2, Ht-1); the health investment of the past periods (I1,…, It-2, It-1); the time histories 
of community characteristics (C0, C1,…,Ct), which include the community infrastructure and 
disease environment; and important time-invariant demographic variables (X) such as gender and 
age.  I summarize those important health determinants below: 
                                                          
37 The model acknowledges that health is both a consumption good that yields direct satisfaction and utility, and an investment 
good, which yields satisfaction to consumers indirectly through fewer sick days. Investment in health is costly as consumers must 
trade off time and resources devoted to health, such as exercising at a local gym, against other goals. These factors are used to 
determine the optimal level of health that an individual will demand. The model makes predictions over the effects of changes in 
prices of healthcare and other goods, labor market outcomes such as employment and wages, and technological changes. 
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Since health stock is treated as a recursive process, I consequently replace health at any time 
(Hm) with above expression for each period t = 0 to t = m-1 induces the following reduced 
equation of health:  
 
The initial health endowment H0 is partly determined by genetic characteristics (G) determined at 
pregnancy. Both critical-period programming model and life-course model support that early-life 
socio-economic status (SES) directly and indirectly affects the health of later life. So I treat 
childhood socioeconomic status (CSES) as another initial health determinate. Also, the original 
location characteristic is also a determinate of the original health endowment. 
 
    3.3.2 Empirical models 
      In examining the relationship between individual’s childhood socioeconomic status (CSES) 
and health in mid-age and the elderly, I begin with the below-reduced equation, setting health in 
old age (Hi) is the function of an individual’s childhood socioeconomic status (CSES), 
demographic characteristics and current location.  
 
      Hijt is the health of individual i living in district l in period t. I are interested in the coefficient 
of β, the impact of CSES on the elderly health outcome. Xi presents demographic controls such 
as age, marital status, the number of children, and current hukou status.38 Lit is the group of 
location dummies. I also include the interview month fixed effect.  is the mean-zero error 
                                                          
38 A hukou is a record in a government system of household registration required by law in mainland China, and determines 
where citizens are allowed to live. The system itself is more properly called "huji", and has origins in ancient China. 
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term. Because in this equation 3.5 I assume that the effects captured by β is very strong, it might 
be driven upwards by omitted variable bias. I except the magnitude of β will decrease if I control 
the education Ei and the log of per capita expenditure Wi. All equations are estimated for men 
and women separately.  
 
 
 
3.4 Data and Sample 
      China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) is a multidisciplinary 
longitudinal survey of middle-aged and the elderly population in China on health, socioeconomic 
status, and social and family network.39 
       The formal survey years of CHARLS are 2011, 2013 and 2014. The baseline national wave1 
was fielded in 2011 and includes about 10,000 households and 17,500 individuals in 150 
counties/districts and 450 villages/resident committees. The respondents are followed every 2 
years, using a face-to-face computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI). The baseline national 
wave 2 finished in 2013. CHARLS wave 3, conducted in 2014 and released in June 2016, 
collected detailed retrospective life histories. I use wave 1 national baseline data and wave 3 life 
history data. The survey includes measurements on health, such as self-reported health condition 
and individual’s functional status; demographics of both individuals and families, educational 
background, childhood living conditions, and several economic measures, such as incomes, 
                                                          
39  CHARLS is designed after the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the United States, and is also harmonized with many 
leading international surveys of the elderly people in other countries, such as the English Longitudinal Survey on Aging (ELSA), 
the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging (KLoSA), the Longitudinal Aging Study in India (LASI), the Survey on Health, Aging, 
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and the Japanese Study of Aging and Retirement (JSTAR).  
See http://charls.pku.edu.cn/en. 
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savings and expenditures. I keep the observations with age 45 to 80, which represents mid-age 
and the elderly group of people. Table 3.1 shows the definition of variables and he sample size 
and statistics for each variable are shown in Table 3.2. 
      I construct a group of dependent variables including good health, disable, chronic disease, 
and difficulty of ADLs / IADLs indicators, the number of chronic diseases, sleeping time and 
adult height.40 For self-rated health status is derived from a question asking the individual to rate 
their health on the five-point scale: very good, good, fair, bad and very bad.41 I then condense 
these responses to a two-point scale: 0 is bad health (bad and very bad categories), 1 is good 
health (very good, good and fair categories).42 There are about 80% of men report they have good 
health status, and 73% for women.  
      To generate the CSES measure, I use the survey question about hunger, family’s financial 
situation, neighborhood cleanliness, access clean water, and energization whey they were before 
17 years old. There are many channels through which those situation affect health. For example, 
not accessing clean water may cause bacterial infections, cholera, dysentery, hepatitis A, typhoid 
and polio.43 Hunger in childhood can lead to insufficient nutrition and, finally linked to adverse 
health outcomes in later life. Using similar strategy with Grimard (2010), I give each condition 
the same weight and combine them together. So the CSES index decreasing with good childhood 
social-economics condition. A CSES index value ranges 0 to 1. Value 1 indicates that the 
                                                          
40 Activities of daily living (ADLs) measure limitations in the following six skills: dressing, bathing, eating, transferring (get into 
or out of bed), toilet use (including getting up and down), and controlling urination and defecation. Instrumental activities of 
daily living (IADLs) measure the five skills including doing housework; preparing meals; groceries shopping; making phone 
calls; taking medications (preparing and taking correct dose); and managing money (paying bills, keeping track of expenses, or 
managing assets). 
41The CHARLS also records the second version of the five-point scale (excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor). I do not use 
the second version in the paper. 
42 In Chinese language, “fair” always means good 
43 http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs391/en/ 
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individual had worse family’s financial condition, experienced hunger, lived in unclean 
neighborhood, did not access clean water and no energized in childhood.   
      Education is measured by a dummy variable for individuals who finished primary school. 
Since dataset has more missing values on income questions and it might be measured with much 
more error. I use per capita expenditure, a better measure of long-run resources, to substitute the 
income. 
 
3.5 Results and robustness check 
      Table 3.3 shows the results of equation 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. Panel A shows the effects of CSES 
on respondents’ self-reported health status, which groups “fair”, “good”, “very good” as “good 
health”. It shows the effects are significant and the magnitudes become lower as I control for 
adult education and expenditure (the proxy of income). In addition, the effects of CSES on other 
health indicators such chronic disease, disease, without ADL problems,  and without IADL 
problem are significant and also showing that bad CSES leads to adverse health measurements in 
the late time. Another important finding is the different effects across gender: effects on women 
is stronger than effects on men. Differential mortality between women and men may explain this 
difference partly (Kishor, 1995). Since females have a mortality advantage during infancy and 
low-health-men might be dead at young age, comparing “good-health-men” with both “good-
health-women” and “low-health-women” generates the gender bias effects in the long-term.   
      Considering the possible endogeneity problem occurs on CSES (the intergenerational effects 
of parents’ SES on children’s SES), I control for SES of the individual’s parents. On life history 
survey, every interviewee was asked questions about parents’ education and occupation 
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circumstance when they were children. Table 3.4 shows the results of equation 3.6, controlling 
for parents background. For women, doing so does not change the significant and magnitude of 
the CSES effects a lot on health outcomes in later life. However, for men, doing so make the 
coefficients of CSES less significant. Also, for bother men and women the parental SES 
variables are jointly insignificant for the dependent variables. This exam confirms my conclusion 
that lower CESC is significantly associated with negative health indicators later. However, for 
respondents who are age 45 to 80 in 2011 (survey year), their parents were born at the end of the 
19th century and grown at the beginning of the 20th century. China was 
in a state of radical upheaval in this period. The majority of people experienced very low living 
conditions and attained less education. For instance, in my sample, the percentage of literate 
mothers is only 1% and 4% for literate fathers. Therefore, the variables of parents’ background 
may not be enough to extract parents’ SES. I should re-investigate this problem after getting data 
with more information in the future.  
      Taking the possible bias of self-reported health status consideration, I generate a more 
restricted indicator of respondents’ self-reported health status grouping “good” and “very good” 
as “good health.” The results showed on Table 3.5 is robust to this concern. The magnitude of 
effects decreases and is significant for both women and men. In addition, the effects of CSES on 
other health indicators such as the number of chronic diseases, the number of ADL problems, the 
number of IADL problem, and sleeping time are significant and also showing that the bad CSES 
leads to adverse health measurements in the late time. For variable “height” measured by 
centimeter, I do not find the significant effect on men. Although the effect for women is 
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significant, the significance is disappeared after I control for adult education and expenditure ( a 
proxy for income).  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
      Using the Chinese Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study, I estimate the long-term 
effects of childhood social-economics status (CSES) on several health outcomes of the elderly 
(people who are aged 45 to 80) in China. I find that for both men and women, unfavorable 
childhood life situation is associated with adverse health status in later life. Although those 
effects could be partially mediated through education of attainment and income during 
adulthood, those effects remain statistically significant when I control for the education of 
attainment and income during adulthood. I also find the long-term CSES effects are stronger for 
women than for men. 
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3.8 Tables and Figures 
Table 3.1  Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
 
Background information 
 
  
Age Age in 2016 
  
Marital Status Dummy = 1 if Married or living with a partner 
  
Number of children Number of living children 
  
Hukou status Dummy = 1 for Urban 
  
City City categories 
    
 
Childhood social economics status 
 
  
Family’s financial situation  
Dummy = 1 if respondent's family financial situation was somewhat/ a lot 
worse off compared to the situation of the average family in the same 
community when the respondent was a child. 
  
Hungary Dummy = 1 if respondent had ever suffered hunger when he/she was a child. 
  
Neighborhood Safety 
Dummy = 1 if respondent's neighborhood where he/she lived as a child was 
not safe at all or not very safe. 
  
Neighborhood Cleanliness  
Dummy = 1 if respondent's neighborhood where he/she lived as a child was 
not clean at all/ not very clean. 
  
Clean water Dummy = 1 if respondent started using clean water when he/she was a child. 
  
Water closet Dummy = 1 if respondent started using water closet when he/she was a child. 
  
Energization Dummy = 1 if respondent started energized when he/she was a child. 
  
CSES index 
0 = best CSES, 1 = Worst CSES. Combined above seven conditions and 
giving them same weight. 
    
 
Adult social economics status 
 
  
Completed primary school Dummy = I if respondent had completed primary school 
  
Log of per capita expenditure Log of per capita expenditure 
    
 
Outcome Measures 
 
  
Good health in 2011 Dummy = 1 if respondent reports 
  
Alternative Good health in 2011 Dummy = 1 if the respondent is disabled. 
  
Disable Dummy = 1 if the respondent is disabled. 
  
Chronic disease Dummy = 1 if the respondent has any chronic disease. 
  
ADLs Dummy = 1 if respondent has no any difficulty in Activities of Daily Living 
  
IADLs 
Dummy = 1 if respondent has no any difficulty in Instrumental Activities of 
Daily Living  
  
# of chronic disease 
Number of chronic diseases (Hypertension, Dyslipidemia, Diabetes, Cancer, 
Stroke, Arthritis, Asthma, Chronic Lung/ Liver/ Hear/ Kidney/ Stomach/ 
Memory-related / Psychiatric disease.) 
  
# of difficulties of ADLs 
Number of difficulties on Activities of Daily Living (Bathing, dressing, going 
to the toilet, Transfer, Continence, and feeding.) 
  
# of difficulties of IADLs 
Number of difficulties on Instrumental Activities of Daily Living 
(Housekeeping, food preparation, shopping, financial management, and 
medication.) 
  
Sleeping time Average sleeping time for one night during the past month. 
  
Height Biomarker of height (cm) in 2011 
    
 
Parental background information 
 
  
Mother is literate Dummy = 1 if biological mother is literate 
  
Father is literate Dummy = 1 if biological father is literate 
  
Mother's main work Dummy = 1 if mother's main occupation is farming 
 
 
Father's main work Dummy = 1 if father's main occupation is farming 
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics  
          
  Variables 
Men   Women 
 
Mean  
Standard 
deviation  
Obs.   Mean  
Standard 
deviation  
Obs.   
 
Age 59.882 8.673 6618 
 
58.643 8.945 7343 
 
 
Marital Status 0.920 0.271 6618 
 
0.869 0.338 7340 
 
 
Number of children 2.544 1.339 6606 
 
2.700 1.394 7330 
 
 
Hukou status 0.203 0.402 6617 
 
0.173 0.378 7340 
 
          
 
Family’s financial situation  0.413 0.492 6580 
 
0.387 0.487 7292 
 
 
Hungary 0.746 0.435 6563 
 
0.684 0.465 7269 
 
 
Neighborhood Cleanliness  0.403 0.491 6471 
 
0.322 0.467 7195 
 
 
Clean water 0.069 0.253 6618 
 
0.068 0.252 7343 
 
 
Energization 0.088 0.283 6618 
 
0.095 0.293 7343 
 
 
CSES index 0.682 0.219 6426 
 
0.646 0.223 7121 
 
          
 
Completed primary school 0.423 0.494 6611 
 
0.234 0.423 7336 
 
 
Log of per capita expenditure 8.480 0.893 6492 
 
8.444 0.909 7161 
 
          
 
Good health in 2011 0.809 0.393 6592 
 
0.730 0.444 7300 
 
 
Alternative Good health in 2011 0.300 0.458 6592 
 
0.212 0.409 7300 
 
 
Disable 0.187 0.390 6601 
 
0.155 0.362 7310 
 
 
Chronic disease 0.656 0.475 6601 
 
0.689 0.463 7309 
 
 
ADLs 0.894 0.308 6536 
 
0.847 0.360 7221 
 
 
IADLs 0.842 0.365 6567 
 
0.768 0.422 7258 
 
 
# of chronic disease 1.282 1.346 6601 
 
1.424 1.412 7309 
 
 
# of difficulties of ADLs 0.228 0.821 6536 
 
0.318 0.924 7221 
 
 
# of difficulties of IADLs 0.314 0.885 6567 
 
0.481 1.058 7258 
 
 
Sleeping time 7.121 2.011 6080 
 
6.720 2.121 6927 
 
 
Height 163.664 6.743 4639 
 
152.656 6.425 5300 
 
          
 
Mother is literate 0.100 0.300 6295 
 
0.106 0.308 7025 
 
 
Father is literate 0.405 0.491 6204 
 
0.402 0.490 6611 
 
 
Mother's main work 0.940 0.238 5839 
 
0.940 0.238 6455 
 
  Father's main work 0.826 0.379 6205   0.813 0.390 6859   
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Table 3.3 Effects of CSES on Middle and aged people's health 
 
Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5) Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5)
CSES Index -0.118*** -0.103*** -0.0980*** -0.208*** -0.188*** -0.186***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Completed primary school 0.0535*** 0.0529*** 0.0631*** 0.0656***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
Log of per capita expenditure 0.0058 -0.00762
(0.006) (0.006)
Regression Wald chi_squared 366.16 381.2 379.22 557.04 577.12 571.68
Pseudo R-squared 0.067 0.0707 0.0713 0.0722 0.0752 0.0757
Observations 6203 6198 6118 6914 6911 6781
CSES Index 0.0744*** 0.0549** 0.0499** 0.0716*** 0.0543*** 0.0509**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Completed primary school -0.0683*** -0.0653*** -0.0572*** -0.0492***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Log of per capita expenditure -0.0139** -0.0188***
(0.006) (0.005)
Regression Wald chi_squared 456.13 489.76 494.64 570.73 583.74 582.57
Pseudo R-squared 0.0895 0.0966 0.0978 0.1119 0.1157 0.1165
Observations 6157 6152 6079 6915 6911 6772
CSES Index 0.0601** 0.0548** 0.0587** 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.116***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Completed primary school -0.0139 -0.021 -0.00148 -0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Log of per capita expenditure 0.0339*** 0.0292***
(0.007) (0.007)
Regression Wald chi_squared 505.97 508.52 502.52 590.87 589.71 594.32
Pseudo R-squared 0.0665 0.0669 0.0678 0.0783 0.0782 0.0814
Observations 6267 6262 6179 6967 6963 6824
CSES Index -0.0545*** -0.0462** -0.0469** -0.117*** -0.106*** -0.106***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Completed primary school 0.0348*** 0.0352*** 0.0393*** 0.0386***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Log of per capita expenditure 0.00344 0.00364
(0.005) (0.005)
Regression Wald chi_squared 431.13 444.97 448.31 690.61 701.42 695.54
Pseudo R-squared 0.1184 0.1247 0.1226 0.1438 0.1463 0.1471
Observations 5886 5881 5818 6813 6809 6678
CSES Index -0.0832*** -0.0655*** -0.0633*** -0.135*** -0.106*** -0.108***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Completed primary school 0.0642*** 0.0610*** 0.0948*** 0.0923***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Log of per capita expenditure 0.0113** 0.0107*
(0.005) (0.006)
Regression Wald chi_squared 562.63 603.32 598.96 762.15 802.99 774.13
Pseudo R-squared 0.126 0.1337 0.135 0.1202 0.1275 0.1243
Observations 6,181 6,176 0.135 6,901 6,897 6,708
Table 3.3 Effects of CSES on Middle and aged people's health
Men Women
Notes: All regressions include controls for age, number of living children, marital status, hukou status and location dummies, 
survey month. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel E: dependent variable (without problem of IADL)
Panel D: dependent variable (without problem of ADL)
Panel C: dependent variable: (chronic disease)
Panel B: dependent variable: (disable)
Panel A: dependent variable (measure of good health)
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Table 3.4  Effects of CSES on Middle and aged people's health, controlling for parental background 
Variables 
Male (Probit marginal effect) 
Measure of 
good health 
Disable 
With at one 
Chronic 
Disease 
Without any 
difficulty of 
ADL 
Without any 
difficulty of 
IADL 
CSES index -0.0925*** 0.0576** 0.0649* -0.0448** -0.0667** 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.033) (0.022) (0.026) 
Completed primary school 0.0671*** -0.0708*** -0.0208 0.0346*** 0.0577*** 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) 
Log of per capita expenditure 0.00428 -0.0168** 0.0293*** 0.00638 0.0143** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Mother is literate 0.00934 0.0263 0.0087 0.000281 0.022 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.017) (0.021) 
Father is literate 0.0173 0.00481 -0.0123 0.00764 0.00637 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) 
Mother's main work is farming 0.032 -0.0374 0.0224 -0.0211 -0.0316 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.029) (0.032) 
Father's main work is farming 0.00839 0.0238 -0.0101 -0.00695 -0.00185 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.015) (0.018) 
      Regression Wald chi squared 335.91 401.1 412.61 391.1 462 
Pseudo R-squared 0.832 0.0998 0.072 0.1359 0.1345 
Joint F-test of parental background variables 3.8 4.28 0.96 2.78 3.97 
Observations 4,691 4,645 4,778 4,381 4,619 
      
      
Variables Female (Probit marginal effect) 
CSES index -0.179*** 0.0567** 0.116*** -0.0900*** -0.0908*** 
 
(0.030) (0.025) (0.031) (0.025) (0.029) 
Completed primary school 0.0652*** -0.0384*** -0.00706 0.0212 0.0820*** 
 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) 
Log of per capita expenditure -0.00968 -0.0234*** 0.0223*** 0.00307 0.00627 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Mother is literate 0.00771 -0.00262 -0.0331 0.0153 0.00356 
 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) 
Father is literate 0.00413 0.00592 -0.0129 -0.0014 0.011 
 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) 
Mother's main work is farming -0.0426 -0.0522** -0.0573* -0.0355 0.0323 
 
(0.035) (0.027) (0.034) (0.031) (0.033) 
Father's main work is farming 0.0218 0.0263 -0.00448 0.000168 -0.0502*** 
 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) 
      Regression Wald chi squared 5,112 4,882 5,141 4,918 5,003 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0868 0.1256 0.083 0.1469 0.1311 
Joint F-test of parental background variables 2.35 5.28 8.05* 1.77 8.89* 
Observations 5017 4794 5046 4772 4890 
Notes: All regressions include controls for age, the number of living children, marital status, Hukou status and location dummies, 
survey month. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5  Robustness checks (Changed dependent variables)       
  
Men 
 
Women 
    Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5)   Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (5) 
Panel A: dependent variable (alternative measure of good health status) 
  
 
CSES INDEX -0.0944*** -0.0790*** -0.0746*** 
 
-0.174*** -0.157*** -0.152*** 
  
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
 
Completed primary school 0.0574*** 0.0537*** 
  
0.0457*** 0.0439*** 
   
(0.012) (0.013) 
  
(0.012) (0.013) 
 
Log of per capita expenditure 
 
0.0199*** 
   
0.00215 
    
(0.007) 
   
(0.006) 
 
Regression Wald 
chi_squared 
491.98 512.78 508.74 
 
517.22 534.08 528.52 
 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0704 0.0736 0.0738 
 
0.0797 0.0814 0.0822 
  Observations 6,258 6,253 6,173   6,958 6,955 6818 
Panel B: dependent variable (number of chronic diseases) 
  
 
CSES INDEX 0.238*** 0.223*** 0.250*** 
 
0.511*** 0.497*** 0.522*** 
  
(0.0788) (0.0799) (0.0807) 
 
(0.0765) (0.0779) (0.0787) 
 
Completed primary 
school  
-0.0417 -0.0683* 
  
-0.0428 -0.0790* 
   
(0.0370) (0.0376) 
  
(0.0428) (0.0437) 
 
Log of per capita 
expenditure   
0.117*** 
   
0.119*** 
    
(0.0211) 
   
(0.0199) 
 
Regression F-test 7.05 7.01 7.06 
 
9.70*** 9.62*** 9.50*** 
 
R-squared 0.1085 0.109 0.112 
 
0.140 0.140 0.143 
  Observations 6,222 6,217 6,135   6,808 6,804 6,673 
Panel C: dependent variable (number of ADL problems) 
  
 
CSES INDEX 0.112*** 0.0905** 0.0905** 
 
0.152*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 
  
(0.0433) (0.0436) (0.0441) 
 
(0.0470) (0.0479) (0.0485) 
 
Completed primary 
school  
-0.0793*** -0.0791*** 
  
-0.0124 -0.0148 
   
(0.0202) (0.0209) 
  
(0.0242) (0.0254) 
 
Log of per capita 
expenditure   
-0.00654 
   
0.00683 
    
(0.0146) 
   
(0.0133) 
 
Regression F-test 3.17 3.12 3.06 
 
4.68*** 9.69*** 9.64*** 
 
R-squared 0.067 0.069 0.069 
 
0.100 0.100 0.101 
  Observations 6,204 6,199 6,122   6,884 6,880 6,746 
Panel D: dependent variable (number of IADL problems) 
  
 
CSES INDEX 0.120*** 0.0873* 0.0774* 
 
0.277*** 0.237*** 0.231*** 
  
(0.0461) (0.0463) (0.0466) 
 
(0.0526) (0.0535) (0.0542) 
 
Completed primary 
school  
-0.117*** -0.116*** 
  
-0.112*** -0.109*** 
   
(0.0209) (0.0211) 
  
(0.0273) (0.0281) 
 
Log of per capita 
expenditure   
-0.0184 
   
-0.0112 
    
(0.0147) 
   
(0.0153) 
 
Regression F-test 3.98 4.1 4.04 
 
6.50*** 6.61*** 6.32*** 
 
R-squared 0.083 0.087 0.089 
 
0.114 0.116 0.118 
  Observations 6,241 6,236 6,158   6,924 6,920 6,787 
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Panel E: dependent variable (sleeping 
time) 
  
     
 
CSES INDEX -0.433*** -0.407*** -0.391*** 
 
-0.504*** -0.438*** -0.458*** 
  
(0.121) (0.123) (0.124) 
 
(0.117) (0.120) (0.122) 
 
Completed primary 
school  
0.0887 0.0937 
  
0.184*** 0.203*** 
   
(0.0568) (0.0578) 
  
(0.0638) (0.0656) 
 
Log of per capita 
expenditure   
-0.00258 
   
-0.0549* 
    
(0.0339) 
   
(0.0329) 
 
Regression F-test 3.62 3.64 3.63 
 
4.70*** 4.79** 4.77*** 
 
R-squared 0.070 0.070 0.071 
 
0.086 0.087 0.088 
  Observations 5,792 5,791 5,718   6,634 6,632 6,503 
Panel F: dependent variable (height) 
  
 
CSES INDEX -2.192 -1.912 -1.907 
 
-0.961** -0.570 -0.450 
  
(1.660) (1.672) (1.715) 
 
(0.436) (0.444) (0.447) 
 
Completed primary 
school  
1.018 1.047 
  
1.182*** 0.982*** 
   
(0.981) (1.030) 
  
(0.227) (0.228) 
 
Log of per capita 
expenditure   
0.0231 
   
0.626*** 
    
(0.431) 
   
(0.110) 
 
Regression F-test 1.16 
   
10.99*** 11.31*** 11.73*** 
 
R-squared 0.040 0.040 0.040 
 
0.167 0.170 0.177 
  Observations 4,435 4,432 4,377 
 
5,071 5,070 4,971 
Notes: All regressions include controls for age, the number of living children, marital status, Hukou status and 
location dummies, survey month. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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